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and Michael J. Phillips**
I. INTRODUCTION
ROMISSORY estoppel has been described as "perhaps the most radi-
cal and expansive development of this century in the law of promis-
sory liability."' From its humble origins as a substitute for
consideration in donative promise cases, 2 this reliance-based doctrine has
come to enjoy application in a wide variety of contexts.3 As one commenta-
tor colorfully has noted: "Like the camel in the Arab's tent,. . once reli-
ance... nosed into contract law it came to occupy more and more space."'4
Despite promissory estoppel's continuing expansion, it was long an article
of faith that the doctrine could not be used to enforce an indefinite or illu-
sory promise.5 Over the past twenty-odd years, however, some courts have
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1. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981). See Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Per-
spective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373, 1373 "[O]ver the past fifty years, the use of promissory
estoppel has expanded dramatically."). These statements, however, do not command universal
assent. See Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303, 304-
05 n. I (1983) (despite the attention reliance-based recovery has received from scholars, "its
practical significance seems to be limited"). Cf. C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 25 (1981)
(promissory estoppel cases are "a belated attempt to plug a gap in the general regime of en-
forcement of promises, a gap left by the artificial and unfortunate doctrine of consideration").
Nor are all observers enthusiastic about promissory estoppel's continued expansion. See Ed-
wards, Promissory Estoppel and the Avoidance of Injustice, 12 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 223, 252
(1987) (concept of avoiding injustice by protecting reliance "ought to be regarded as having
reached the maximum boundaries of its scope" until its desirable limits are thoroughly
explored).
2. See infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
3. Indeed, the authors have argued that it is emerging as a theory of recovery independ-
ent of contract. See Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an In-
dependent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472 (1983). See also infra notes 95-100
and accompanying text.
4. Feinman, supra note 1, at 1374.
5. See infra notes 80-87, 105-14 and accompanying text. An illusory promise is basically
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employed promissory estoppel to protect reliance on indefinite promises.
Although such cases remain controversial and relatively rare, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS has expressly approved this use of the reli-
ance principle.6 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) does not sanction, however,
promissory estoppel's use to protect those who rely on illusory promises, and
few courts have openly employed the doctrine in such a fashion.7 Nonethe-
less, this article contends that many courts have extended protection to
promisees whose reliance on illusory promises exposed them to potential in-
justice.8 The courts in question have done so under a variety of legal rubrics,
including exercises in contract manipulation designed to render illusory
promises binding and the application of modem contract doctrines such as
good faith and unconscionability.
Thus, the camel has intruded into the tent of contract law more than
many had forseen. In determining whether it should be encouraged to stay,
or whether this part of the tent should remain off-limits, this Article explores
the reasons for protecting those who rely on illusory promises, and the argu-
ments against affording such protection. This Article concludes that such
reliance sometimes deserves protection and that there are a number of good
arguments for explicitly recognizing promissory estoppel as a major vehicle
for protecting such reliance. Not the least of these arguments is the fact that
in some situations promissory estoppel is superior to the other legal devices
currently employed to protect reliance on illusory promises. As a necessary
preface to the discussion of these matters, the Article first examines the his-
torical origins and evolution of the legal protection based on reliance in gen-
eral, and of promissory estoppel in particular.
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Historical and Moral Claims of Reliance
Commentators and scholars generally agree that the reliance principle
played a central role in the precontract action of assumpsit and in early for-
mulations of the doctrine of consideration. 9 For these reasons, the funda-
an expression that imposes no obligation on the promisor even though it is stated in promis-
sory form. See infra note 109. For a discussion of the overlap between indefinite and illusory
promises, see infra note 110.
6. See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. On the pervasive influence of reliance
principles throughout the Restatement (Second), see generally Knapp, supra note 1.
7. See infra notes 105-148, 162-167 and accompanying text.
8. See generally infra notes 168-300 and accompanying text.
9. "There is, of course, no question but that, from the very earliest time-that is the
second half of the sixteenth century-when the doctrine of consideration was being formulated
in connection with the new action of assumpsit, detriment and benefit were seen as alternative
forms of consideration." P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 185
(1979) [thereinafter P. ATIYAH] See also P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 3
(1981) [hereinafter cited as PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW] (doctrine of consideration as rec-
ognized during reign of Elizabeth I satisfied "if the promisee acted to his detriment in reliance
on the promise, so that the non-fulfillment of the promise would cause him actual pecuniary
loss"); Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 679 (1984)
(dominance of bargain theory in nineteenth century has obscured the fact that "in the eight-
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mental purpose of simple contracts historically was a desire to protect
justifiable reliance on a promise.10 This desire to protect such justifiable reli-
ance was also a significant factor in the formation of fraud and warranty
law.1" These early examples of the reliance principle's influence should not
be surprising. The moral and legal obligation to fulfill promises 12 has long
been justified not only by their tendency to create reasonable expectations
in the mind of the promisee, I3 but also by their tendency to induce reli-
eenth century promises were often enforced primarily because the promisee had relied on the
promise to her detriment or to the promisor's benefit").
10. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS section 139, at 502 (2d ed. 1936).
11. "[T]he early beginnings of the law of fraud and warranty clearly rest on the idea of a
justifiable reliance. The question always seems to be, did the plaintiff reasonably rely upon
what the defendant said, or should the plaintiff have made his own inquiries, his own examina-
tion?" P. ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 188.
12. "From antiquity the moral obligation to keep a promise [has] been a cardinal tenet of
ethical philosophers, publicists, and philosophical jurists." Pound, Promise or Bargain? 33
TUL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1959), quoted in Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination
of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1261 n.1 (1980) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott].
Goetz and Scott likewise observe that "[t]he obligation to keep promises is a commonly ac-
knowledged moral duty." Goetz & Scott, supra, at 1261. But they also correctly point out that
"intuitionist" theories of contract premised on some inherent moral obligation to fulfill
promises are inadequate because they fail to explain "the simple fact that no legal system
attempts to enforce all promises." Id. at 1263 n.15. See also PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW,
supra note 9, at 2 (English common law "has never treated the mere fact that a promise has
been made as even prima facie a sufficient condition for the creation of a legal obligation"); IA
A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS section 110, at 490 (1963) (mere fact of promise creates
no legal duty; to be enforceable promise must be accompanied by some other factor); Eisen-
berg, Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 640 (1982) (promise, as such, not
enforceable; first "great question" of contract law therefore what kinds of promises should be
enforced).
13. On the importance of promisees' expectations in justifying enforcement of promises,
see 1 CORBIN, supra note 12, section 1, at 2 (main underlying purpose of contract law to
facilitate the "realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a
promise"). For an attempt at an ethical justification for satisfying such expectations, see C.
FRIED, supra note 1, at 16 (individuals are morally bound to keep their promises because by
making them they have invoked a convention whose function is to give another grounds for
expecting the promised performance). However, the need to realize such expectations has also
been justified on the basis of individual and social wealth maximization. See, e.g., R. POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236-37 (1922) (wealth in a commercial age
is composed largely of promises; therefore, the social interest in security of transactions re-
quires that we secure to the promisee the expectation which has become a part of his sub-
stance); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 123
(1979) (most conventional pieties such as promise-keeping can be derived from the wealth-
maximization principle; adherence facilitates transactions, and hence wealth). In addition, it
has been argued that enforcing promises and rewarding expectations is essential to the mainte-
nance of social order. See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943) (unless reasonable expectations created
by promises receive legal protection, "we will suffer the fate of Montesquieu's Troglodytes,
who perished because they did not fulfill their promises"); Knapp, The Promise of the Future-
and Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REV.
932, 950-51 (1984) (suggesting a focus on the underlying principle "that whenever a promise is
made which generates in the promisee a reasonable expectation of performance, its unjustified
nonperformance should in theory be an actionable wrong," and arguing that "promise-keeping
in general is not merely praiseworthy behavior, but an absolutely necessary glue for holding
society together"). In fact, some commentators have gone so far as to urge the protection of
expectations that form independent of the terms of a party's promises or, in a few cases, of
expectations that are contradicted by the express terms of a party's promises. See infra note
358 and accompanying text.
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ance. 14 In fact, some scholars have argued that claims based on reliance are
more compelling than those sounding merely in disappointed expectations.15
Given these impeccable historical credentials, it is at first glance some-
what surprising that the reliance principle was so thoroughly de-
emphasized 16 in the classical contract law of the nineteenth century. One
prominent authority has attributed this de-emphasis to the imperfect histori-
cal and doctrinal understanding of nineteenth century contract scholars. 17
The authors, however, prefer to attribute the submergence of reliance-and
also, perhaps, the scholars' deficient perceptions-to the laissez-faire spirit
animating classical contract law.18 Due in part to its resulting "[n]o man is
14. "[P]romises and contracts invite trust, involve reliance and dependence by others on
the word of the promisor." P. ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 82. See also, PROMISES, MORALS,
AND LAW, supra note 9, at 9, 36 (discussing the ideas of the French jurist Francois de Con-
nan, who argued that promises only create obligations if they are relied upon or if some ex-
change of promises has occurred, and later observing that "the fact that promises tend to be
relied upon, that they positively invite reliance, is one of the chief grounds for the rule that
promises should be kept"); Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 810
(1941) (reliance seen as a substantive basis of contract liability due to "a recognition that the
breach of a promise may work an injury to one who has changed his position in reliance on the
expectation that the promise would be fulfilled"). Not everyone, however, agrees with these
propositions. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1263-64 n.15 for the assertion that:
"[I]f moral force is attached to promises merely because people rely upon them, the argument
is subject to the claim that such reliance is dependent upon legal enforceability." This argu-
ment is one that has plagued promissory estoppel in the past and that has obvious negative
implications for the protection of reliance on illusory promises. We address it at infra notes
325-48 and accompanying text.
15. "[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may not
thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing case for relief than the
promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was
promised him." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.- Parts I, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936). Fuller and Perdue argued that the restitution interest presents the
most compelling claim for judicial protection because it combines both unjust impoverishment
of the promisee and unjust gain by the promisor. Id. Under this analysis, the promisee's
expectation interest is the interest least deserving of protection because compensating loss of
expectancy rather than protecting change of position involves passing "from the realm of cor-
rective justice to that of distributive justice." Id. See also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CON-
TRACTS section 91, at 195 (1974) ("While the expectation interest is the normal interest
protected in contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that the reliance interest presents a greater claim
to protection."); PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW, supra note 9, at 32 (discussing English phi-
losopher Henry Sidgwick's assertion that while the duty to keep promises was independent of
any injury that might be done to the promisee by nonperformance, action in reliance by the
promisee aggravates the seriousness of a breach).
16. "The reliance principle of the eighteenth century did not fit within the structure of the
classical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century." Feinman, supra note 9, at 681.
17. The whole of this problem [the de-emphasis of reliance in classical contract
law] seems to have arisen from the failure of nineteenth-century legal scholars
and historians to perceive the changes which had occurred in contractual theory
during their own century. These historians assumed that contractual theory in
the seventeenth and eighteenth century had been based-as it came to be based
in the nineteenth century-on the idea of mutually binding promises; the
promises had to be binding at the time they were exchanged for that was when a
contract was thought to be "formed." Consequently, they did not understand
how an act of detrimental reliance occurring after a promise was given could ex
post facto invest the promise with a binding contractual character.
P. ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 185 (emphasis in original).
18. On the development of classical contract law and its links to economic laissez-faire,
see, e.g., L. FRIEDMANN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 244 (1973); W. FRIEDMANN, LAW
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his brother's keeper" ethos,19 this body of law tended to limit contractual
liability.20 One way in which it did so was the bargain theory of considera-
tion,21 which operates to deny promisees recovery for unbargained-for reli-
ance.22 Finally, although it has been asserted that the decline of reliance
during this period was primarily verbal or conceptual, 23 it is also not difficult
to identify cases where courts applying the bargain theory have reached
seemingly unfair results. 24
B. Reliance Resurgent: The Recognition of Promissory Estoppel
Whatever the reasons for the shift in doctrinal thinking, 25 courts in the
early part of this century were less willing than their nineteenth century
predecessors to deny protection to those who relied on gratuitous
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 119-29 (2d Penguin ed. 1972); M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW 160-85 (1977); Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the
Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 144-53 (1980).
19. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (paperback ed. 1974).
20. "The theory seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one
should be liable to anyone for anything. Since the ideal was not attainable, the compromise
solution was to restrict liability within the narrowest possible limits." Id. at 14.
21. The best known statement of the bargain idea belongs to Justice Holmes:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is
given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the
promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement
for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of
reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration
and promise.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (M. Howe ed., paperback ed. 1963). The bargain
theory was subsequently enshrined in both contracts Restatements. See RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS section 75 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS sections 71(1),(2)
(1981). On the incompatibility between promissory estoppel and bargain theory, see G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 19, at 61 (sections 75 and 90 of the first Restatement are "contradictory
propositions" that "cannot live comfortably together").
22. The classical contract attitude toward unbargained-for reliance has been summarized
as follows: "[I]f A, without the protection of a binding contract, improvidently relies, to his
detriment, on B's promises and assurances, that may be unfortunate for A but is no fit matter
for legal concern." G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 15.
23. P. ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 455. Atiyah supports this argument as follows:
Courts, judges, and lawyers came to perceive nearly all liabilities as arising from
contract, and from the consensualism that they now took to underlie contract.
They tended, therefore, to base liability, even where there was an important
element of reliance or benefit in the case, not on that element, but on some
consensual element .... If there was no apparent consensual element in the case,
but the Courts still felt moved to impose liability, either as a result of their own
sense of justice, or as a result of the weight of tradition and precedent, then they
were inclined to find some "implied" contract, consent, promise, or agreement.
Id
24. See, e.g., Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (denying any recovery to
the part-owner of a lost sailing vessel for reliance on the "gratuitous" promise of his co-owner
to insure the vessel for its last voyage).
25. The most probable explanations for the changed judicial attitude are socio-historical.
See, e.g., Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 500-08 (attempting to link the rise of promissory
estoppel to the social and economic changes affecting the evolution of twentieth century con-
tract law); Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 Sw. L.J. 931, 965-67
(1988) (attempting to link the rise of promissory estoppel to the greater degree of interdepen-
dence characterizing modern society).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
promises. 26 They responded to the argument that unbargained-for reliance
on gratuitous promises is unreasonable by noting that such reliance is a com-
mon occurrence. 27 By denying recovery for detriment that was not a quid
pro quo for the promise, 28 the bargain theory ignored the promisor's role in
inducing reliance and unjustifiably allowed promisors to avoid responsibility
for consequences that they knew were likely to result from their actions.29
Given equity's historic role of mitigating the harsh results that would other-
wise follow from the strict application of common law rules, 30 it is not sur-
prising that early twentieth century jurists seeking to avoid such injustice
often turned to an equitable principle, the doctrine of equitable estoppel.31
Equitable estoppel protects those who rely on the representations of others
by preventing the representor "from denying or asserting anything to the
contrary of that which by the person's own deeds, acts, or representations,
has been set forward as the truth. ' 32 The protection equitable estoppel af-
forded to relying promisees, however, was significantly limited. Initial for-
26. "[U]nlike Holmes, many judges.. .were not prepared to look with stony-eyed indiffer-
ence on the plight of a plaintiff who had, to his detriment, relied on a defendant's assurances
without the protection of a formal contract." G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 63-64.
27. See Seavey, Reliance on Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV.
913, 924-25 (195 1). For a further discussion of this point, see infra notes 333-338 and accom-
panying text.
28. See G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 64 (new bargain theory prevented turn-of-the-
century judges from allowing promisee to recover by precluding them from declaring prom-
isee's detriment "consideration"). See also supra note 21 (providing a classic statement of the
bargained-for exchange requirement).
29. "[O]ne who makes a promise intending not to keep it misrepresents his intent and, as
in other cases of deceitful misrepresentation, it should not be a defense that the defendant
succeeded in taking advantage of the plaintiff's credulity." Seavey, supra note 27, at 925. See
also Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 373
(1969).
30. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 22, for a discussion of the Chancellor's role as the
"keeper of the King's conscience."
31. See G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 63-64. Since bargain theory prevented a conven-
tional contract recovery in cases where the promisee had relied to his detriment, Gilmore
noted, judges desirous of protecting the promisee "had to find a new solution, or, at least, a
new terminology." Id. at 64. "In such a situation the word that comes instinctively to the mind
of any judge is, of course, 'estoppel'...." Id
32. Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1041 (1974). The traditional formulation of the doctrine is
as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a repre-
sentation or a concealment of material facts.
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said
conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is
necessarily imputed to him.
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claim-
ing the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at
the time when it was acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expecta-
tion, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances
that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon....
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he
must be led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for
the worse....
3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE section 805, at 191-92 (5th ed.
1941) (emphasis in original). Equitable estoppel has also been said to require unconscionable
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mulations of the doctrine required that the recipient of the representation
prove fraudulent intent on the part of the representor. 33 More importantly,
equitable estoppel by its terms applied only to misstatements of facts, not to
promises.34 Thus, promisees whose reliance was induced solely by promises
of future performance were unprotected.
Because the fact/promise distinction has long been regarded as artificial, 35
the argument that it is unjust to deny recovery for reliance on promises
while protecting those who rely on misstatements of fact is easy to make. 36
In fact this technical distinction did not long survive the twentieth century
concern for just results. 37 In such a climate, the emergence of a doctrine to
protect reliance on promises-that is, a doctrine of promissory estoppel-was
inevitable.38
Promissory estoppel, however, did not emerge fully developed, or even
acknowledged, from its early judicial cocoon. Instead, courts protected
those who relied on promises by forcing cases into the bargain mold and
pretending that consideration existed, 39 or by purporting to apply equitable
estoppel despite the absence of that doctrine's limited traditional elements. 40
conduct on the part of the party inducing reliance. See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SALES section 15, at 93 & n.62 (2d ed. 1959).
33. See Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of
Frauds, 66 MICH. L. REV. 170, 174 n.21 (1967). By the end of the nineteenth century this
hurdle to recovery had been lowered significantly by courts requiring only that the victim of
the misstatement prove that it would "work a fraud" on him. See Note, Part Performance,
Estoppel, and the California Statute of Frauds, 3 STAN. L. REV. 281, 290 (1951).
34. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 376; Seavey, supra note 27, at 914.
35. "[E]very statement of the future includes some statement of present facts" because
"statements concerning the future and...promises [both] involve representations as to the
present state of mind of the speaker." Seavey, supra note 27, at 922-23, 914. See also Edging-
ton v. Fitzmaurise, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885) ("the state of a man's mind is as much of a fact
as the state of his digestion").
36. For such an argument, see Seavey, supra note 27, at 914.
37. On this general tendency in modern contract law, see, e.g., Summers, The General
Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811
(1982) (discussing requirements of "contractual morality," the increasing recognition of which
is "one of the hallmarks of the law of our time"); Note, C & K Engineering Contractors v.
Amber Steel Co.: Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by Jury in California, 31 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 697, 711-12 (1980) (extension of protection to those who rely on promises consis-
tent with other modern contract law changes recognizing fairness as substantive basis of
contract liability).
38. Henderson, supra note 29, at 376.
39. For a detailed examination of the precedential origins of promissory estoppel, see
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: Parts I & II, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639,
873 (1952) [hereinafter Boyer]. Boyer found such precedents in cases involving gratuitous
agencies, gratuitous bailments, bonus and pension promises, rent reduction promises, and
waivers. Id. at 665-74, 873-98. Also, Grant Gilmore identified as forerunners of promissory
estoppel a number of cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals during Justice Car-
dozo's tenure. See G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 62. In addition to finding consideration
where none existed, the courts in these cases also protected reliance by supplying missing
contract terms and implying promises in the absence of express promises. Id.
40. See Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909), for an excellent example of
this phenomenon. In Seymour, the court denied an employer-promisor's statute of frauds de-
fense to a ten-year oral employment contract on the basis of the employer's ancillary promise
to reduce the contract to written form and the employee's substantial reliance on that promise.
Id. at 800, 100 P. at 96. (The employee had relied by giving up secure employment and pen-
sion rights to accept the promised employment.) The court justified its decision on the basis of
1990]
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Samuel Williston was the first to coin the term "promissory estoppel" to
rationalize such cases, 41 although even he apparently was reluctant to recog-
nize it in the first RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS. 42 But the reliance princi-
ple ultimately won out when promissory estoppel gained formal recognition
in section 90 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS. 4 3
C. The Elements of Section 90
Section 90 provides that: "[A] promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of
the promise." 44 By stating that reliance on a promise can justify enforcement
of a contract, section 90 plainly parts company with equitable estoppel and
its emphasis on misstatements of fact. Only promises that the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce reliance, however, can serve as the basis
for liability. The focus here is on the promisor's reasonable expectations at
the time the promise was made; given all the circumstances known to him,
should he have reasonably expected his promise to induce reliance?45
By itself, however, such a promise is insufficient to trigger the operation of
section 90. In addition, the promise must actually induce action or forbear-
ance (i.e., reliance) of a definite and substantial character before the risk of
enforcement arises. The evident aim of the "definite and substantial reli-
ance" requirement is to prevent recovery for insubstantial forms of reli-
equitable estoppel. Id. Because no misstatement of fact was at issue, however, the case plainly
sounds in promissory estoppel. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel applied to the Statute of
Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 454 (1931).
41. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel.- Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA.
L. REV. 459, 459 n.l (1950) (citing 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS section 139, at
308 (1st ed. 1920)).
42. For Arthur Corbin's account of the process that resulted in promissory estoppel's
recognition in the first Restatement, see G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 60-64. Apparently
Corbin overcame the reluctance of Williston and others by citing numerous examples of cases
in which courts had imposed liability despite the absence of the bargained-for consideration
contemplated by section 75 of the Restatement. Id. at 63-64.
43. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS section 90 (1932). The drafters of the RESTATEMENT
also recognized a limited role for promissory estoppel in circumventing the writing require-
ment of the Statute of Frauds. Id. section 178 comment f (1932). This comment merely sanc-
tioned the outcome in Seymour v. Oelrichs, see supra note 40, and appropriately designated it
as an application of promissory estoppel.
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS section 90 (1932).
45. This test is an objective one, and if a court determines that the promisor should have
foreseen reliance by the promisee, the fact that he did not actually foresee reliance is irrelevant.
Boyer, supra note 41, at 461. It should also be noted that the question whether the promisor
should reasonably have foreseen reliance by the promisee overlaps with inquiries into the rea-
sonableness of the promisee's reliance, since the courts are rarely likely to hold that the prom-
isor should reasonably have expected unreasonable reliance. This point is indirectly
acknowledged by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) in a comment to its revised version of section
90, which states that "the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" is a factor to be consid-
ered in resolving promissory estoppel's last element-whether injustice can only be avoided by




ance.46 Implicit in this inquiry into the substantiality of the promisee's
reliance, moreover, is a judgment on the justice of the result the promisee
seeks. 47 This consideration is explicitly made an element of recovery under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel by the last words of the section, which
make the promise binding only if injustice can be avoided by its enforce-
ment. Although the main focus of this open-ended requirement appears to
be the harm the promisee would suffer in the event of nonenforcement, con-
sideration of the promisor's position is implicitly part of the process of deter-
mining the nature of his promise and the substantiality of the reliance it
produced. 48
D. Some Applications of Promissory Estoppel
1. The "Donative Promise" Limitation and Its Demise
The articulation of the elements of promissory estoppel in section 90 and
the imprimatur of the RESTATEMENT did not produce immediate and wide-
spread acceptance of the doctrine. Its subsequent evolution49 occurred in the
face of significant judicial resistance, some of which may have been the prod-
uct of confusion 50 or institutional conservatism, 5' but much of which doubt-
less stemmed from genuine reservations concerning the wisdom of extending
substantial protection to unbargained-for reliance. 52 Learned Hand plainly
exemplified such reservations in his decision in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
46. On the change in this requirement wrought by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), See in-
fra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether reliance is still the pri-
mary focus of promissory estoppel, see infra notes 365-390 and accompanying text.
47. Boyer, supra note 41, at 475. The idea here is that insubstantial reliance by the prom-
isee is unlikely to produce a judicial belief that enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice. Id.
48. The idea here is that any hardship to the promisor that would flow from enforcement
can be justified by his role in making a promise which he should have foreseen would induce
reliance by the promisee. Id. at 461-62, 485. Concern for the unfair impact enforcement can
sometimes have on the promisor arguably has been an important factor in slowing the ad-
vancement of promissory estoppel. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
49. One very important application of promissory estoppel that is given fairly short shrift
here is the use of the doctrine to enforce promises that otherwise would be rendered unenforce-
able by the statute of frauds. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Metzger, The Parol
Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1422-37 (1983).
See also supra notes 40, 43 and infra notes 151, 169. However, this application of promissory
estoppel is peripheral to the concerns of this Article.
50. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 377 n. 192 for a collection of cases in which courts
appeared to confuse the elements of equitable and promissory estoppel. See also Note, Estop-
pel and the Statute of Frauds, 26 KAN. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (1978) (equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel are "so similar that many courts fail to distinguish adequately between
them, and some use the terms interchangeably"). The courts may perhaps be forgiven such
confusion when one considers the confusion alleged to have attended the birth of section 90.
See G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 64-65 ("An attentive study of the four illustrations [to
section 90] will lead any analyst to the despairing conclusion, which is of course reinforced by
the mysterious text of section 90 itself, that no one had any idea what the damn thing
meant.").
51. See Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 120 n.53 (1975) (judicial failure to properly distinguish between
promissory and equitable estoppel due in part to the fact that equitable estoppel is "more
established in the law, and courts are loath to establish new exceptions").
52. Under classical contract doctrine, after all, gratuitous promises were among those
least deserving of protection. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 346.
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Brothers, Inc.,5 3 which held that promissory estoppel was unavailable to pro-
tect reliance on offers proposing a bargained-for exchange. Promissory es-
toppel, in Hand's view, applied only to purely gratuitous or "donative"
promises.54
Limiting promissory estoppel's role as consideration substitute to donative
promise cases was hardly unjustified. After all, the first cases in which the
doctrine was stated involved such promises, 55 and the drafting history of
section 90 suggests a similar focus. 56 But while Hand's view held sway for
the next twenty-five years, numerous factors militated in favor of a broader
role for the reliance principle. Whatever the drafter's focus may have been,
the language of section 90 neither expressly nor impliedly 57 restricts its ap-
plication to donative promise cases. More importantly, both reliance and
the injustice that can flow from it are as predictable in the bargain context as
they are in the case of the gratuitous promise.5 8 Add to these considerations
the inherently expansionist nature of the reliance principle,59 and it was only
a matter of time before promissory estoppel escaped the strictures of Baird.
Promissory estoppel moved beyond the donative promise limitation per-
manently60 when the California Supreme Court decided Drennan v. Star
53. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). Baird concerned the now familiar situation in which a
general contractor relies on a subcontractor's bid by incorporating the subcontractor's bid into
its own bid, and then seeks to prevent the subcontractor from revoking its bid on the ground
that allowing revocation would cause the general contractor to incur reliance losses. Baird is
discussed in detail in Boyer, supra note 41, at 491-93.
54. 64 F.2d at 346. See also 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS section 140, at 504 (rev. ed.
1936) (seemingly limiting promissory estoppel to traditionally protected categories like those
suggested in supra note 39).
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. "The proceedings leading to the drafting of Section 90.. .evidence concern solely with
justifiable detrimental reliance on promises for which no agreed equivalent has been asked or
tendered." Henderson, supra note 29, at 345.
57. See Boyer, supra note 41, at 492; Note, Promissory Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel and
the Farmer as Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and the UC. C. Statute of Frauds, 1977 UTAH
L. REV. 59, 82 (to say that reliance can justify enforcement of gratuitous promises is not to
proclaim it unable to justify enforcement in other contexts).
58. "Injustice can result where a gratuitous promise is given in connection with a com-
mercial transaction as easily as it can in the instance of a charitable subscription." Boyer, supra
note 41, at 492-93.
59. Once one accepts that it is sometimes permissible to overlook the absence of a tradi-
tional element of contract in order to avoid the injustice that would otherwise flow from un-
compensated reliance, one is inevitably moved to ask whether other traditional elements also
might be dispensable under certain circumstances. Grant Gilmore thought that bargain theory
and the reliance principle were so inherently antithetical that "in the end one must swallow the
other up." G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 61. While Gilmore's prediction has not yet come
true, increased protection of reliance is an evident trend in modern contract law. E.g., Pettit,
Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. REV. 551, 595 (1983) ("Throughout this century the
path has been toward increased enforceability of promises, express or implied, that have been
followed by some action on the part of the promisee."). One common set of explanations for
the solicitude reliance has received root that solicitude in the characteristics of twentieth cen-
tury society, most notably its increased interdependence. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 14, at 823
("with an increasing interdependence among the members of society we may expect to see
reliance (unbargained-for, or half-bargained-for) become increasingly important as a basis of
liability"); and the sources cited in supra note 25.
60. For a few pre-Drennan cases that apparently ignored Baird's gratuitous promise limi-
tation, see Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941); North-
western Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
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Paving Co. 61 in 1958. Like Baird,62 Drennan involved a general contractor
who had relied upon a subcontractor's bid in computing its own bid, and
then sought to prevent the sub from revoking its bid when the general con-
tractor's bid was accepted. Holding for the general contractor, Chief Justice
Traynor implied a promise on the subcontractor's part not to revoke its bid,
and then used promissory estoppel to enforce this gratuitous promise.63 The
result in Drennan has since gained wide acceptance. 64
2 Damages Questions
The reliance principle's entry into the bargain context triggered other ju-
dicial concerns about the proper scope of promissory estoppel. Prominent
among such concerns was the fear that protecting promisees who rely might
sometimes work an injustice on promisors.65 A major reason for this fear
was the uncertainty regarding the proper measure of damages in promissory
estoppel cases. Although it is generally agreed that promissory estoppel is
unavailable in cases where a quantum meruit or quasi-contractual recovery
of the promisee's restitution interest 66 will suffice to avoid injustice, 67 a
promisee's losses in reliance will often exceed any benefit that the promisor
derived from that reliance. 68 In such cases, should a promisee receive a full
61. 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
62. See supra note 53.
63. 51 Cal. 2d at 409, 333 P.2d at 760. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 355-56 for a full
discussion of Drennan.
64. See, e.g., Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 181 Ind. App. 336, 339-
40, 391 N.E.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1979); E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J.
Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). The outcome in Drennan has also
gained the imprimatur of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS section 87(2) & illustration 6 (1981). See also the discussion at infra notes 150-
151 and accompanying text.
65. See Boyer, supra note 41, at 489; Note, Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds
in California, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1245 (1978).
66. The restitution interest is the value that the promisor's reliance has conferred upon
the promisor. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 53-54. It is awarded to prevent the defaulting
promisor from gaining at the promisee's expense. Id. at 54. It has been argued that among the
three interests-reliance, expectation, and restitution-contract damages principles might pro-
tect, the restitution interest presents the strongest claim for relief due to its combination of
both unjust impoverishment and unjust gain. Id. at 56.
67. This position is attributed to the traditional rule that equitable relief is only available
in the absence of an adequate remedy at law, and to the belief that if the parties truly can be
returned to the status quo, no further enforcement of the promisor's promise is necessary to
avoid injustice. On the first point, see Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in
California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 590, 601 (1965). On the latter point, see Boyer, supra note 41,
at 485.
68. Boyer, supra note 41, at 486.
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expectation award69 or damages based on his reliance interest?70 Even
though the rationale for promissory estoppel recovery suggests that reliance
damages should be the measure of recovery,7 1 the courts generally have
granted expectation awards through full enforcement of the promisor's
promise. 72
69. Expectancy awards attempt to give promisees the value of the expectancy that the
promise created by placing them is as good a position as they would have occupied had the
promise been performed. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 54. Damage awards based on
expectancy have been justified on a number of grounds. Breach of promise, it is said, arouses
in the promisee a sense of injury that exists independently of any actions in reliance on the
promise. Id. at 57. Will theory also furnishes some justification for expectancy awards by
making them necessary if the state is to enforce the "private law" created by the parties when
they formed their contract. Id. at 58. Expectancy awards may also be necessary to recognize
that "expectations of future values become for purposes of trade, present values," and to reim-
burse promisees for elements of reliance that may be difficult to prove. Id. at 59, 60. Expec-
tancy awards may also protect reliance by serving as a prophylaxis against reliance losses.
Since the expectancy standard is often easier to administer than the reliance standard, it may
offer a more effective sanction against breaches of contract and therefore discourage breach.
Id. at 61. Viewed this way, the purpose of an expectancy award is "not so much to compen-
sate the promisee as to penalize breach of promise by the promisor." Id. By protecting reli-
ance in this way, expectancy awards encourage reliance more than would exclusively reliance-
based awards because the difficulties of proof associated with the latter might sometimes dis-
courage reliance. Id. at 61-62.
70. The reliance interest is defined by the value of the promisee's change of position in
anticipation of the promisor's performance. Awards of reliance-based damages seek to return
the promisee to the position he occupied before the promisor made his promise. Id. at 54.
Although the reliance interest is normally conceived as embracing losses of an affirmative na-
ture (e.g., expenditures of money or labor), losses due to foregone opportunities ("gains pre-
vented") are at least conceptually within its purview. Id. at 55, 74-75. Losses of this second
kind, however, may be particularly difficult to prove, id. at 60, and this difficulty may make
some courts reluctant to recognize them. See Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contrac-
tual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 630-31 (1983) (in franchise termination context,
foregone opportunities problematic because court cannot be sure promisee would actually have
availed himself of opportunity or that opportunity would have been profitable, but courts
should consider such reliance losses where not too remote or speculative); Hudec, Restating
the "Reliance Interest" 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704, 719 (1982) (foregone opportunities more
difficult for courts to conceptualize as involving clear diminution of present assets like those
associated with out-of-pocket losses, but if promisee can prove opportunity loss and its value
with sufficient certainty courts should recognize it).
71. Dean Boyer argued that the tendency of courts to grant expectancy awards in promis-
sory estoppel cases "seems to ignore the very 'injustice' which Section 90 purports to avoid,"
and that injustice to the promisee "is avoided when he is protected to the extent of his expendi-
tures made in reliance upon the... promise." Boyer, supra note 41, at 487. See also Seavey,
supra note 27, at 926 (as wrong sought to be avoided in promissory estoppel cases "is not
primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to
change position to his detriment," it follows that "damages should not exceed the loss caused
by the change of position").
72. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 9, at 687-88 (typical damage remedy in most promis-
sory estoppel cases is expectancy award); Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum
of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 49 (1986) ("[A]n enormous
discontinuity exists between what contracts scholars for the last twenty years have thought
was happening in the courts in connection with the flexible remedy in section 90 and what
actually was happening."). Feinman attributes the award of expectancy damages to the shift
in the nature of the cases comprising the bulk of promissory estoppel litigation from donative
promise situations to business disputes, and to the courts' perception that expectancy awards
may better reflect opportunity losses in such cases than would reliance awards. Feinman,
supra note 9, at 688. Fuller and Perdue noted in their classic article on the reliance interest
that most of their arguments in favor of measuring damages by expectancy did not apply to
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This stance finds support in the language of section 90,73 in promissory
estoppel's traditional role as a consideration substitute,74 in the traditional
association between expectation awards and contract,75 and in the analogous
association between reliance-based awards and tort. 76 In addition, some
cases exist in which reliance-based damages would not fully compensate the
promisee. 77 But in the situation where the cost of full performance by the
promisor greatly exceeds the promisee's losses in reliance, 78 a court limiting
promissory estoppel recovery to the promisee's expectation may deny any
recovery if it believes that complete enforcement would be unjust to the
promisor.79
3. Indefinite Promises
For the reasons stated above, reliance-based damage awards may some-
times be preferable in promissory estoppel cases,80 and some courts have in
fact been willing to allow such recoveries.8" For present purposes, it is sig-
nificant that many of the cases fashioning reliance-based awards arose from
the contract negotiations, that is, the offer and acceptance context. Here,
those seeking recovery for their reliance have traditionally faced a number of
significant obstacles. First, the traditional rule stated that only genuine
promises could serve as the basis of a promissory estoppel recovery.82 Thus,
indefinite promises8 3 were not proper subjects for the doctrine's applica-
donative promises. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 64. For their arguments in favor of
expectancy awards, see supra note 69.
73. Promises that satisfy the section's tests are said to be "binding," and injustice is
avoided by "enforcement of the promise." See supra text accompanying note 44. Williston
told the American Law Institute that expectation damages would be the norm under section
90, saying: "Either the promise is binding or it is not. If it is binding it has to be enforced as
made .. " 4 PROCEEDINGS, A.L.I., App. 95-96, 98-99, 101-104 (1926), quoted in Boyer,
supra note 41, at 487 n.121. See also Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH.
L. REV. 908, 944 n. 110 (1937) (observing that the drafters of section 90 apparently assumed
that "the usual contracts remedies and rules of damages will apply" while personally arguing
in favor of a reliance-based standard).
74. If promissory estoppel is contractual in nature, and merely serves to provide the miss-
ing element(s) necessary to the creation of a binding contract, then once the element in ques-
tion is supplied normal contract enforcement should logically follow. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 51, at 126.
75. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 89-96; Note, supra note 65, at 1245.
76. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15, at 90 n.61. Despite this longstanding association,
Fuller and Perdue ultimately concluded that the reliance interest has always been an element
of contract damages. Id. at 89-96.
77. See Note, supra note 51, at 128-29. Prominent among such situations are those where
reliance is difficult to prove, or involves lost opportunities. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 15,
at 60. Some situations exist, however, in which there will be little difference between a reli-
ance-based award and an expectation-based award. Id. at 73-75. There may also, however, be
situations in which the reliance interest exceeds the expectation interest. See id. at 75-77.
78. Boyer, supra note 41, at 489.
79. Id. at 491.
80. See id. at 497.
81. See, e.g., the cases discussed in infra notes 92, 135 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 361.
83. Under traditional contract principles, a promise may be too indefinite for enforcement
if it is too vague or too incomplete. E.g., id. at 362. Agreements reserving of significant matters
for future agreement by the parties ("agreements to agree") were also too indefinite for en-
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tion.s4 In such cases, there was no promise capable of judicial enforcement
through specific performance or an expectation award.85 Second, serious
doubts may have existed as to the reasonableness of a promisee's reliance on
such promises.86 Finally, the intrusion of the reliance principle into the ne-
gotiations context plainly denies a freedom lying at the heart of the tradi-
tional rules on offer and acceptance: the freedom from liability on unchosen
terms.87
Notwithstanding such obstacles, a number of cases use promissory estop-
pel to protect reliance on indefinite promises arising out of contract negotia-
tions.88 The best known example of this use of estoppel is Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc. 89 There, Hoffman, the disappointed seeker of a convenience
store franchise, sought to recover his reliance losses9° when lengthy negotia-
tions with Red Owl (the franchisor) collapsed in the face of Red Owl's ever-
increasing demands. In its defense, Red Owl argued that the parties had
forcement under classical principles. 1 S. WILLIS'TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS section 45 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957). The first RESTATEMENT adopted this traditional
position on definiteness. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS section 32 (1932). The traditional
rule has been said to reflect a policy judgment that contract law should be certain (especially in
the formation process), an empirical assumption that bargains are discrete transactions in
which the parties will agree on all material terms at the time of contracting, and (in cases
where the parties failed to agree) an aversion to the difficulties presented by the courts' supply-
ing a term. Speidel, Restatement Second, Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1982).
84. For cases requiring a definite promise as a precondition of promissory estoppel liabil-
ity, see, e.g., Perlin v. Board of Educ., 86 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114, 407 N.E.2d 792, 798 (1980)
("unambiguous" promise); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 23 Ill. App. 3d 137,
139, 318 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1974) (promise "unambiguous in terms"); Malaker Corp. Stock-
holder's Protective Comm. v. First New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 479, 395 A.2d
222, 230 (App. Div. 1978) ("clear and definite" promise).
85. Cf. Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing
and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM L. REV. 217, 227-28 (1987) (discussing situations where it
is appropriate to include lost opportunities in reliance damages; these include cases in which
expectation damages are unavailable because the agreement is illusory or is too indefinite to be
enforceable since there is no expectancy to be measured in such cases).
86. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 361-62 ("The idea behind the [promise] requirement
is simply that promissory estoppel protects reasonable reliance, and that, in the nature of
things, reliance is reasonable only if it is induced by an actual promise."). See also infra note
113.
87. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 357-58 (primary thrust of offer and acceptance
rules "to guarantee parties seeking an exchange extensive freedom to express, or to refuse to
express, a willingness to be bound," and "to insure that, in most instances, obligation attaches
only when it has been deliberately undertaken"). See also Edwards, supra note 1, at 236 (nego-
tiation stage regarded as "critical to the exercise of freedom of contract" by traditional theory).
88. See, e.g., Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1984); Walters v.
Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth.,
646 P.2d 900, 905 (Colo. App. 1982); Mooney v. Craddock, 35 Colo. Ct. App. 20, 25-26, 530
P.2d 1302, 1305 (1974); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
89. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). Extended discussions of Hoffman can be
found in Henderson, supra note 29, at 358-60, and Note, Contracts: Reliance Losses: Promis-
sory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery for Breach of Agreement to Agree, Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966).
90. In reliance on assurances that he would receive a franchise, Hoffman sold his bakery
at a loss, acquired a small grocery (which he later sold at a loss at the defendants' urging) to
gain experience in the business (an attribute Red Owl allegedly preferred in its franchisees),
bought an option on a site for the franchise store, and moved his family closer to the site. 26
Wis. 2d at 687-88, 133 N.W.2d at 269-70.
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never reached agreement on the essential terms of the franchise, and there-
fore that no contract existed. 91 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed, but
granted Hoffman recovery under promissory estoppel. 92 The language of
section 90, the Court noted, does not require that the promise triggering
reliance be "so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an
offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee. ' '93 More
controversial was the Court's famous observation that it would be a mistake
to equate promissory estoppel to a breach-of-contract action.94
The latter statement by the Hoffman court plainly suggests that promis-
sory estoppel has become a theory of recovery independent of contract.95
This view is shared by various observers who have described promissory es-
toppel as a tort theory,96 a hybrid of tort and contract,97 a theory of recovery
separate and distinct from contract or tort, 98 and an "anti-contract" the-
ory99 that might trigger a fusion of contract and tort.10° Others have de-
scribed Hoffman as exemplifying a growing judicial tendency to impose
precontractual liability' 0' based on promises made to interest the promisee
91. Id. at 697, 133 N.W.2d at 274.
92. Hoffman received damages calculated to reimburse his reliance losses, but was denied
the lost profits he sought. The Court concluded that "[w]here damages are awarded in promis-
sory estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise, they should be only such
as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice. Mechanical or rule-of-thumb
approaches to the damage problem should be avoided." Id. at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276.
Precedent for such an award in a negotiations case was set some seventeen years before
Hoffman. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). In Goodman the plaintiffs
were encouraged by the local Emerson Radio Corporation distributor to apply for an Emerson
dealer franchise. They were subsequently told that their application had been accepted, that
the franchise would be granted, and that they would receive an initial delivery of 30 to 40
radios. Id. at 684. In reliance on these assurances, they hired salesmen, began to solicit orders
for radios, and commenced other preparations to do business. When no franchise ultimately
was awarded, the plaintiffs filed suit, and the court held that the defendants were "estopped"
from denying the existence of a contract due to their statements and the plaintiffs' reliance. Id.
The court's language is a mixture of both equitable and promissory estoppel terminology, but
its emphasis is largely on the defendants' "promise...that a franchise would be granted"
rather than upon any misstatement of fact on the defendant's part. Id. at 685. Whatever the
basis of its decision, the court affirmed the trial court's award of reliance damages but reversed
its award of lost profits. Id.
93. 26 Wis. 2d at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
94. Id.
95. For a detailed argument to this effect, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 508-50.
96. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 24 (Hoffman damage award had nothing to do
with enforcing a promise, instead being a tort-like punishment of bad bargaining behavior);
Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepre-
sentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 487 & 489-92 (1987) (portraying Goodman v. Dicker and
Hoffman as based on tort notions of misrepresentation); Seavey, supra note 27, at 926 (estoppel
"basically a tort doctrine" because wrong involved is causing plaintiff "to change position to
his detriment" rather than depriving him of promised reward).
97. See Shattuck, supra note 73, at 942.
98. See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222, 225 (1891); Note, Promis-
sory Estoppel-The Basis of a Cause of Action Which is Neither Contract, Tort or Quasi-Con-
tract, 40 Mo. L. REV. 163 (1975).
99. G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 61. Gilmore also described the bargain theory of
consideration and promissory estoppel as "matter and anti-matter." Id.
100. Id. at 90 (promissory estoppel "may ultimately provide the doctrinal justification for
the fusing of contract and tort in a unified theory of civil obligation)."
101. Farnsworth, supra note 85, at 222. Farnsworth notes that even Drennan v. Star Paw-
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in negotiations, 10 2 and as an intrusion of the modem contract doctrine of
good faith 10 3 into the negotiations context. 1°4 Of course, Hoffman may be
portrayed as allowing promissory estoppel to substitute for the definite ex-
pressions of assent traditionally required for contract liability, much as it has
come to be accepted as a substitute for consideration. But to do so is to
transform the notion of contract into something far from its conventional
meaning.
E. Illusory Promises
Commentators predictably have criticized Hoffman for undermining free-
dom of contract 0 5 and have questioned its actual impact. 106 But as we have
seen, cases explicitly 10 7 using promissory estoppel to protect reliance on in-
definite promises are not infrequent. 0 8 But what about this Article's major
concern: using promissory estoppel to enforce promises that are illusory 109
ing Co., see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text, represents "a limited inroad into the
traditional freedom of negotiation." Id. at 222 n. 13.
102. Id. at 236. Seen this way, liability was imposed on Red Owl "as a result of a promise
that the $18,000 cash that he could contribute would suffice to obtain a franchise." Id.
103. The requirement of good faith and its use as an alternative device to protect reliance
are discussed at infra notes 187-255 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 359 (Hoffman can be viewed as establishing the
beginnings of an "important new legal duty of good faith in the conduct of contract negotia-
tions"); Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UC.C.: Good Faith and the Doc-
trine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 879 (1979) (Hoffman an example of use of
promissory estoppel to police bad faith withdrawal of offers); Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to
Bargain, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 673, 688 (1969) (Hoffman can be reasonably interpreted as "fur-
nishing authority for the proposition that one may in some circumstances come under a duty
to bargain in good faith"); Note, supra note 89, at 355 (Hoffman involved "the creation of a
new right which looks very much like a cause of action for breach of an implied promise to
negotiate in good faith"). However, both the U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) good faith
provisions concern good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts, not good faith
in contract formation. See the discussion at infra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
105. E.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 236 (Hoffman restricts freedom to negotiate without
liability, a freedom regarded as critical under classical theory); Henderson, supra note 29, at
360. As the following quotation indicates, however, Hoffman has not been without admirers:
In deciding Hoffman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices viewed society as
composed of interdependent parties engaging in ongoing transactions giving rise
to obligations even before the point of formal offer and acceptance ("cooperative
contract"), rather than composed of isolated parties entering into discrete trans-
actions after careful bargaining ("freedom of contract").
Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 855 (1983).
106. Farnsworth, supra note 85, at 237 (in the two decades since it was decided Hoffman's
influence "has been more marked in the law reviews than in the law reports").
107. One reason why there may not be more such cases is that in many situations where
reliance on indefinite promises is protected the court simply does not mention the indefinite-
ness problem in its decision, or protects reliance by using a legal device other than estoppel.
On the former point, see Barnett & Becker, supra note 96, at 477 ("As with the use of promis-
sory estoppel to avoid Statutes of Frauds and Parol Evidence Rule problems, promissory es-
toppel is often used to enforce indefinite promises without any discussion of indefiniteness.")
On the latter, see infra notes 182-186, 214 and accompanying text.
108. Also, the Hoffman result has gained the approval of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND).
See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
109. An illusory promise is one that in reality imposes no obligation on the promisor. E.g.,
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS section 4-17, at 159 (2d ed. 1977) ("an
expression cloaked in promissory terms, but which, upon closer examination, reveals that the
promisor has committed himself not at all"); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS section 145
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rather than indefinite? 1 ° Like indefinite promises, illusory promises have
traditionally been considered insufficient to support promissory estoppel lia-
bility III because they are not true promises."12 As with indefinite promises,
moreover, doubts have existed as to the reasonableness of relying on illusory
promises' I3 and the courts' ability to enforce such promises., " 4
Despite these traditional obstacles, however, promissory estoppel has
found application in illusory promise situations. Consider for example the
case of Hunter v. Hayes,' 15 in which the plaintiff Hunter quit her job with a
telephone company in reliance on promised employment as a flag girl with a
construction company. The defendants reneged on their offer, and Hunter
(one volume ed. 1952) ("words in promissory form that promise nothing; they do not purport
to put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor, but leave his future action subject
to his own future will, just as it would have been had he said no words at all"); E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS section 2.13, at 73 (1982) ("a promise in form but not in substance"). It
has generally been held that an illusory promise does not supply consideration for a return
promise and that bilateral agreements in which one of the promises is illusory cannot be en-
forced by either party. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra, section 4-17, at 160; E.
FARNSWORTH, supra, section 2.13, at 73.
This result has traditionally been attributed to the doctrine of "mutuality of obligation."
E.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra, section 4-17, at 160; E. FARNSWORTH, supra, section
2.13, at 73 n.3. For a classic statement of the mutuality requirement, see W. ANSON, PRINCI-
PLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS RELATION To CON-
TRACT 93 n.2 (J. Knowlton 2d American ed. 1857) ("When the only consideration to sustain
the contract is that arising out of mutual promises, the mutuality must be absolute so that each
party must have an action in case of breach or neither is bound"). Illusory promises cannot
meet this test because it would be "impossible to show a breach" of such a promise. J. MUR-
RAY, supra note 15, section 90, at 192 n.58. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), however, has al-
most entirely disavowed the mutuality requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS section 79(c) & comment f (1981).
110. However, in some cases the distinction between illusory promises and indefinite
promises may be more imagined than real. A sufficient amount of indefiniteness can operate to
render a promise illusory as well. E.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 109, section 4-
17, at 159-60 (many cases analyzed as indefiniteness cases can also be treated as illusory prom-
ise cases, using as an example offer to supply such quantities "as your storekeeper may order
from time to time" at specified prices); A. CORBIN, supra note 109, section 65 ("I accept your
offer" is illusory when made in response to an offer to sell specified goods at certain prices;
while a mutual expression of assent is present, the offeree's failure to state a quantity renders
assent illusory); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 83, section 43, at 145-46 ("The difficulty with
illusory promises may be two-fold: indefiniteness and insufficiency of consideration."); Pratt,
American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C.L. REV. 415, 441 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Pratt] ("The [mutuality of obligation] rule could be satisfied only if there were obligations
to be imposed on both sides; if an obligation was not fully described, it was not enforceable.").
In other cases, however, the distinction seems meaningful. A complete and certain promise
containing an absolute termination clause, for example, presumably would be illusory but not
indefinite.
I ll. See, e.g., Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 458, 287 P.2d 735, 738
(1955); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 199, 203, 665 P.2d 414, 416 (1983), both
discussed infra note 134.
112. E.g., IA A. CORBIN, supra note 12, section 201 (section 90 does not apply to an
illusory promise because reliance cannot transform such a promise into a true promise).
113. E.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 109, section 16 (giving example of an illusory promise
and saying "the words used.. .are not such as may reasonably be relied upon"). In fact, it has
been suggested that relying on illusory promises is generally less reasonable than relying on
incomplete promises. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 362 n.96. We consider this issue at infra
notes 325-348 and accompanying text.
114. Cf supra note 85.
115. 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1975).
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was unable to find employment for two months. The trial court granted her
an award based on her lost wages for those two months, and the defendants
appealed, arguing among other things, that no evidence existed of a meeting
of the minds, and therefore, no contract was present to be breached. 16 The
Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, but found the defendants' argument ir-
relevant because the circumstances warranted the application of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel even without evidence of a meeting of the minds or
independent consideration.' 17 The defendants made Hunter a promise upon
which she foreseeably relied to her detriment, "18 and these factors were suffi-
cient to justify liability.1 19 Nowhere did the court address the fact that the
employment relation promised to Hunter was probably one of employment-
at-will.' 20 Promises of this kind traditionally have been held to be illusory
no matter how definitely worded,' 2 ' due to the ability of either party to ter-
minate the relationship at any time and for any reason, without notice.' 22
The illusory nature of a promise of future employment-at-will was ad-
dressed explicitly, and with the same ultimate outcome as Hunter, in Grouse
v. Group Health Plan, Inc. 123 In Grouse, the plaintiff, a young pharmacist
working in a retail pharmacy, applied for and ultimately was offered a posi-
tion with the defendant clinic. In reliance on the promised job with Group
Health, he gave notice of resignation to his employer, and turned down an-
other offer of employment. After this, Grouse was told that another person
had been hired in his stead due to the clinic's inability to secure the favorable
written reference required by company policy. 124 Grouse had difficulty find-
ing another job, and the lower court dismissed his subsequent suit against
Group Health for failure to state an actionable claim. The Minnesota
Supreme Court disagreed, although it acknowledged that "[o]n these facts
no contract exists because due to the bilateral power of termination neither
party is committed to performance and the promises are, therefore, illu-
116. Id. at 953.
117. Id. Here the court cited Hoffman and Mooney v. Craddock, 35 Colo. App. 20, 530
P.2d 1302 (1974).
118. The court found that the defendants "not only offered Hunter a job.... but also told
her to terminate her position at the telephone company." Id.
119. 533 P.2d at 953.
120. The defendant offered evidence concerning its collective bargaining agreement, but the
court found that it had "no bearing on the legal issues in this case," and that its only signifi-
cance was as evidence that Hunter was not promised employment "contrary to the terms of
the agreement." Id. at 954. This raises the possibility that Hunter might ultimately have
gained some job security rights under that agreement had she been allowed to start work.
121. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 109, section 65; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109,
section 2.14, at 77; Barnett & Becker, supra note 96, at 478.
122. A classic formulation of this doctrine may be found in Payne v. Western & Atlanta
R.R.Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884): "All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many
or few, for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without thereby being
guilty of a legal wrong."
123. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
124. Two faculty members at the University of Minnesota declined to give references, and
an internship employer and several pharmacies where Grouse had done relief work declined on
the ground that they had insufficient experience on which to base an evaluation. Grouse's
current employer was not contacted due to a request to that effect on his job application with
Group Health. 306 N.W.2d at 116.
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sory."' 125 This was no obstacle to recovery, however, because promissory
estoppel applied 126 and its effect was "to imply a contract in law where none
existed in fact." 127 Group Health argued that it would be anomalous to
allow an employee who had not even reported to work to recover when the
same employee could be discharged with impunity after the first day on the
job. The court again disagreed, stating that it believed, under certain cir-
cumstances, that section 90 would apply even after employment has be-
gun. 128 The Court said Grouse could assume that he would be given a good
faith opportunity to perform his duties once he was on the job. 129 Given the
indefinite duration of the employment promised, Grouse's proper remedy
was the amount he lost quitting the job he held and in turning down the
other offer of employment. 130
The Hunter and Grouse courts are not alone in recognizing promissory
estoppel's applicability to protect reliance on promises of at-will employ-
ment. Other courts have used promissory estoppel to prevent employers
from revoking offers of such employment,131 and to prevent them from dis-
125. Id.
126. The court quoted the text of section 90, and said that the defendant "knew that to
accept its offer Grouse would have to resign his employment," and that "[u]nder these circum-
stances it would be unjust not to hold Group Health to its promise." Id.
127. Id.
128. I For a case with a similar result but a somewhat narrower deployment of promis-
sory estoppel, see Bower v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988), where
the court allowed former employees to recover under promissory estoppel for the employer's
breach of an at-will promise to rehire them in new positions. But here, unlike Grouse, the court
seemingly concluded that promissory estoppel is inapplicable where the promisee has actually
been hired and is terminated shortly thereafter. See id. at 363 (following Missouri law). In the
case before it, though, the plaintiff employees had never been rehired, and the employer there-
fore breached its promise to provide them an at-will employment. Id. As the court explained:
While, in practical effect, it may be hard to distinguish the case in which an
employee is fired a day after beginning work from the situation in which a po-
tential employee is prevented from assuming a promised at-will position, the
cases are different. In the former case, the employer has completely fulfilled his
promise; in the latter, the promise has not been kept in any respect.
Id. at 363-64 (emphasis in original).
129. 306 N.W.2d at 116. On good faith as a limit on employers' power to discharge em-
ployees with impunity, see infra note 247.
130. Id. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial on the damage
issue. Note that the court's language suggests the possibility that Grouse could recover for the
"lost opportunity" represented by the turned-down job offer. See supra notes 70, 77, 85. But
while such losses apparently were easily provable in this case, they may be quite difficult to
prove, though no less real, in many cases that are otherwise quite similar. Consider for exam-
ple the graduating student who quits interviewing after accepting a job offer early in the annual
recruiting season, only to have the employer renege after the recruiting season is over. See also
Pettit, supra note 59, at 592-93 for a discussion of the difficulties faced by employees who seek
to prove reliance on a benefit plan promised by their employers.
131. See, e.g., Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66 Hawaii 194, 658 P.2d 883 (1983); Pepsi-Cola
General Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. App. 1982); Lorson v. Falcon Coach,
Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974). See also Bower v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 852
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988), discussed in supra note 128. In Ravelo, the plaintiff and his wife both
quit their jobs in reliance on the defendant's promise to hire the plaintiff as a county police
officer. He was then informed that the defendant was not going to hire him. When he filed suit
against the defendant, his suit was dismissed on the ground that he "was at best a probationary
employee whose employment was terminable without cause at any time prior to the comple-
tion of a period of probationary service." Ravelo, 66 Hawaii at 197-98, 658 P.2d at 886. The
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charging current at-will employees. 132 There are, however, cases to the con-
trary. 1 33 In fact, two cases which most emphatically reject the application of
Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed that Ravelo's complaint did not support a claim "premised
on breach of a formal contract," but nonetheless found relief appropriate under promissory
estoppel. Id. at 198, 658 P.2d at 886-87. The court noted the changes to section 90 in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), and remanded the case in a manner which strongly suggested that a
reliance-based award would be appropriate. Id. at 200-01 & nn.3-4, 658 P.2d at 887-88 &
nn.3-4.
In Woods, the court recognized that promissory estoppel applied to protect the plaintiff, who
had quit her job in reliance on a promise of employment from Pepsi, which later reneged when
it discovered that her boyfriend worked for Coca-Cola. 440 N.E.2d at 699. She ultimately was
denied any recovery, however, because there was "not sufficient proof of out-of pocket ex-
penses" such as "moving or job-hunting expenses." Id. The outcome in this case was proba-
bly influenced by evidence suggesting that the plaintiff might have been able to regain her old
job had she chosen to do so, and that she found lesser-paying employment within two weeks
and an equivalent job after 26 weeks. See id. at 697.
132. See Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 104, 483 N.E.2d 150, 155
(1985) (reversing summary judgment against discharged employee and recognizing that prom-
issory estoppel can sometimes operate to prevent discharge of at-will employees); Jones v. East
Center for Community Mental Health, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 19, 482 N.E.2d 969 (1984). In
Jones, the court reversed a summary judgment against a discharged employee who argued that
statements in the company personnel manual she received after her hiring removed her em-
ployment from the at-will category. The court observed that:
Where.. .the employment manual does not mention that the employer retains
the right to terminate "at will" or where it fails to inform the employees that the
manual is of no legal significance, the promises contained therein are quite likely
to create expectations of benefit and lead employees to some form of action or
forbearance in reliance on those promises. Indeed, why would an employer
adopt the policies contained in an employment manual if it did not expect to
benefit from them? If an employer is allowed to make unqualified and high-
sounding promises of fair treatment and job security in order to obtain loyal and
long-standing employees, and then disaffirm such promises and rely on the "at-
will" doctrine (conspicuous by its absence in the employee's manual), injustice
will frequently result.
19 Ohio App. 3d at 23, 482 N.E.2d at 974. Two points about the Jones opinion are of particu-
lar interest. First, the court cited Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), one of several cases holding that statements in an em-
ployee manual can become part of the employment contract, and suggested that Toussaint was
"best analyzed under the principles of promissory estoppel." 19 Ohio App. 3d at 23 n.2, 482
N.E.2d at 974 n.2. Second, although the court remanded the case "for the application of
promissory estoppel" and appeared to prejudge the outcome (stating that injustice "can be
avoided here only by enforcing the promissory representations" contained in the manual),
there is no indication that the plaintiff demonstrated any actual reliance. Id. at 24, 482 N.E.2d
at 975. As the above quotation suggests, the court appeared to assume the existence of reliance
from the fact of the promises' existence.
133. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Mayer v. King
Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. App. 1983); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967). Bixby held that promissory estoppel was not avail-
able to prevent the discharge of employees promised permanent employment, despite evidence
that many had relied on the promise by giving up other jobs, moving to the defendant's loca-
tion, and giving up farm leases. 196 F. Supp. at 891, 904. There, the plaintiffs had been hired
to replace strikers at the defendant's plant. Pursuant to an arbitration award after the strike
settlement (an award with which the defendant's representative on the arbitration panel dis-
agreed), the strikers were given seniority and the plaintiffs were discharged. Id. at 892. Pro-
tection of the plaintiffs' reliance could only have come at the price of imposing liability on the
defendant, a less-than-willing participant in their discharge. Instead, the court fell back on the
wealth of traditional authority to the effect that promises of permanent employment create
only an employment at will. Id. at 893.
The same authority operated with similar devastating effect in Forrer, where the plaintiff had
been induced to quit farming (selling his stock at a loss) and to return to work for his former
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promissory estoppel to illusory promises derive from the employment
context. 134
In a few instances, courts have recognized the availability of promissory
employer by a promise of permanent employment. In his suit for his discharge without cause
less than a year later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin opined that it "would not hesitate to
apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel under these facts if justice required it." 36 Wis. 2d
at 392, 153 N.W.2d at 589. But it then found that since the defendant had honored its prom-
ise, which amounted in law to nothing more than a promise of at-will employment, justice
dictated no further recovery. Being unencumbered with the arcana of a legal education, the
plaintiff was doubtless surprised by this conclusion. It is hard to imagine that he would have
acted as he did had he understood Sears to say: "Quit farming and incur reliance losses and
we'll give you a job; but we reserve the right to fire you at any time, for any reason, and
without notice." The outcome in Mayer is far easier to understand. There, the plaintiff
moved to the defendant's location in pursuit of a promised three-year written employment
contract which never materialized. Instead, the relationship deteriorated and the Plaintiff was
discharged after a few months. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to use promissory
estoppel to overcome the defendant's statute of frauds defense to the alleged three-year oral
employment contract, finding none of the doctrine's requirements satisfied. Many terms of the
alleged contract had not been agreed to, including the important question of the plaintiff's
commission. Therefore, instead of having a "promise," the plaintiff had an "expectation of a
promise." 660 S.W.2d at 749. More importantly, there was no "detrimental reliance" or "in-
justice" as a result of reliance because the plaintiff was unemployed at the time he accepted the
position with defendant, had recovered a judgment for his moving expenses at the trial level,
and had been compensated at the agreed-upon rate for his work while employed by the defend-
ant. Id. The court's conclusion that he was merely an employee-at-will therefore did not
operate to deny him recovery for the only reliance losses he alleged.
134. See Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955); Good-
paster v. Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 199, 665 P.2d 414 (1983). (both involving promises to pay
discretionary bonuses). In Spooner, the court refused to allow the plaintiff life insurance agents
to recover the promised bonuses, despite asserting that the defendant was "perilously near the
perpetration of a fraud," and that the plaintiffs "have reason to be dissatisfied" with what they
had been paid. 47 Wash. 2d at 459, 287 P.2d at 738. The major obstacle confronting the
plaintiffs was clear language in the bulletin containing the bonus plan that rendered any pay-
ments entirely discretionary at the defendant's option. The bonus was described as a "volun-
tary contribution" that "may be withheld, increased, decreased or discontinued...with or
without notice." Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 737. The court acknowledged promissory estoppel's
role in protecting significant employee reliance on gratuitous employer bonus promises, but
said that "before this rule can be applied, there must be a real promise to be enforced." Id. at
458, 287 P.2d at 738. An additional problem was identifying any losses in reliance suffered by
the plaintiffs, who were admittedly denied recovery of the readily-computable expectancy in-
terest created by the bonus plan. Any additional policy sales generated by the promised plan
resulted in increased regular commissions to the plaintiffs, and therefore some recovery for
their reliance. Of course, some agents may have stayed with Reserve in anticipation of the
promised bonuses, but the court stated that "if they were in any instance induced to stay with
the company until the termination of the bonus period, it was because they were relying on the
corporate conscience" of the defendant, and this statement suggests that no such proof of lost
opportunities was in fact offered. Id. at 459, 287 P.2d at 738. Reserve, at least initially, appar-
ently thought that it would benefit from the plan. The bulletin announcing the plan said:
"Reserve wants career men-men who are as much concerned about next year as next month.
To attract such workers, and inspire their best efforts, your Company now puts into effect a
schedule of Bonus Payments." Id. at 455, 287 P.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). Goodpaster,
a child of Spooner, is far less troubling in its outcome. Goodpaster, an employee who was fired
after being placed on nine months' probation for substandard performance, was denied recov-
ery of a bonus that the company sales manual expressly stated was discretionary. The court
noted that Pfizer had good cause to discharge him, observing that "the record is replete with
facts showing Goodpaster's substandard performance during his last 6 years with Pfizer," and,
citing Spooner, that "[a]ction in reliance upon a supposed promise creates no obligation on a
corporation whose promise is illusory." 35 Wash. App. at 202-03, 665 P.2d at 416. The court




estoppel as a limit on the power of manufacturers to terminate their distribu-
tors under agreements so indefinite that they arguably were illusory.1 35
Most dealer termination cases, however, have been dealt with under other
legal rubrics.136 Finally, some instances of reliance on illusory promises
fairly cry out for promissory estoppel's ministrations, but in these cases the
doctrine's use was apparently neither sought by the promisee nor considered
by the court. Consider for example the case of Streich v. General Motors
Corporation. 13
7
In Streich the plaintiff was a component parts manufacturer who had in-
curred significant reliance expenditures while preparing to supply General
Motors with air magnet valves under a purchase order prepared by G.M.'s
attorneys. The agreement included a provision stating that G.M. "will have
no liability for payment for material or items delivered to Buyer which are in
excess of quantities specified in the delivery schedules."' 138 The net effect of
this provision was that the seller agreed to sell a valve at a fixed price in
whatever quantities the buyer might designate, when and if the buyer issued
a purchase order. 3 9 Thus, General Motors' promise was rendered illu-
sory. 40 Streich found a void behind the facade when G.M. ordered only
twelve of an anticipated 1,600 units.' 4' The court acknowledged that
Streich was misled by the many and detailed provisions 142 of the decep-
tive' 43 purchase orders, which were "artfully prepared,"'"4 in fine print, 45
and that Streich had undoubtedly gone to considerable expense preparing to
135. See Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir.
1968) (reversing summary judgment against terminated long-term exclusive distributor; sub-
stantial alleged reliance may justify promissory estoppel liability); L.S. Good & Co. v. H.
Daroff & Sons, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. W.Va. 1968) (denying manufacturer's mo-
tion to dismiss suit by exclusive distributor for damages flowing from manufacturer's sales to
plaintiff's competitor; even if no contract existed, defendant could be liable for plaintiff's out-
of-pocket reliance expenditures under theory of promissory estoppel); Whorral v. Drewrys
Ltd. U.S.A., 214 F. Supp. 269, 270-71 (S.D. Iowa 1963) (due to significant reliance by plaintiff,
defendant estopped from denying existence of indefinite oral exclusive beer distributorship
agreement and from terminating relationship after only 10 months); Hardin v. Eska Co., 256
Iowa 371, 374-75, 127 N.W.2d 595, 596-97 (1964) (promissory estoppel allows dealer to re-
cover reliance damages from manufacturer who violated indefinite exclusive dealership
agreement).
136. See infra notes 182-185, 214-242, 281-286 and accompanying text.
137. 5 Ill. App. 2d 485, 126 N.E.2d 389 (1955).
138. Id. at 489.90, 126 N.E.2d at 391-92.
139. Id. at 494, 126 N.E.2d at 394.
140. Id. at 495, 126 N.E.2d at 394. G.M. is, of course, not beyond arguing to the contrary
when its interests so dictate. See Propane Indus., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 429 F. Supp.
214 (W.D. Wyo. 1977). There, G.M. sought to enforce a similar "purchase order" against a
propane gas supplier after a gas shortage created market prices far in excess of the price speci-
fied in the purchase order. It argued unsuccessfully that the purchase order constituted a bind-
ing requirements contract or, in the alternative, that the parties' prior dealings created an
implied promise on its part to issue releases for the "possible requirement" of 500,000 gallons
stated in the purchase order. Id. at 218, 221.
141. 5 Ill. App. 2d at 500, 126 N.E.2d at 397.
142. Id. at 496, 126 N.E.2d at 395.
143. Id. at 500, 126 N.E.2d at 397.
144. Id. at 499, 126 N.E.2d at 397.
145. Id. at 499-500, 126 N.E.2d at 397.
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perform the contract. 146 Nonetheless, the trial court could do nothing but
sustain G.M.'s motion to dismiss because 147 courts "are not clothed with the
power to make contracts for parties, nor can they, under the guise of inter-
pretation, supply provisions actually lacking or impose obligations not actu-
ally assumed."' 48
F Reliance Revisited: Promissory Estoppel and the Restatement (Second)
Streich was decided in 1955. Must the Streichs of the world face a similar
fate today? As a first step toward answering this question, it is necessary to
examine the state of the reliance doctrine under the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS.14 9 Many of the developments chronicled in the pre-
ceding subsections were well entrenched when the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS emerged in 1981, a fact the new RESTATEMENT recognizes
in several specific provisions. For example, section 87(2) sanctions the Dren-
nan result' 50 by using promissory estoppel to prevent the revocation of some
offers.15 1 In addition, the text of section 90 itself has undergone an evolution
that reflects, at least in part, the progress of reliance in the decades following
the original RESTATEMENT. 152 A promisee's reliance no longer need be defi-
nite and substantial 53 to trigger the operation of the section (a change
linked' 54 to new language explicitly sanctioning partial enforcement of a
promisor's promise by an award of reliance-based damages).' 55 Moreover,
146. Id. at 496, 126 N.E.2d at 395.
147. Id. at 500, 126 N.E.2d at 397.
148. Id. at 496, 126 N.E.2d at 395.
149. For an extensive treatment of this subject, see generally Knapp, supra note 1.
150. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 87(2) (1981). Also, the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) firmly establishes reliance as a justification for circumventing the writ-
ing requirement of the statute of frauds. Id. section 139. See supra note 49.
152. The revised section now reads as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.
Id. section 90(1). Section 90(2) sanctions the enforcement of charitable subscriptions and mar-
riage settlements under section 90(1) "without proof that the promise induced action or for-
bearance." Id. section 90(2). As its language suggests, the new section 90 also makes
foreseeable third-party reliance a possible basis for enforcing promises. For a detailed treat-
ment of this subject, see generally Metzger & Phillips, supra note 25.
153. See supra notes 44, 46 and accompanying text.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Reporter's Note (1981); ALl, 42D AN-
NUAL MEETING, PROCEEDINGS 296-97 (1965). As professor Knapp has observed:
This deletion responds to the argument of Fuller and Perdue that the section as
originally drafted appeared to require the promisee's reliance to have been "defi-
nite and substantial" enough to justify full enforcement of the expectation cre-
ated by the promise; the drafters seem to have assumed that retention of that
language would undercut the new policy of permitting partial enforcement.
Knapp, supra note 1, at 58 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
155. "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 90 (1981). A comment to section 90 says that available
remedies include "full-scale enforcement by normal [contract] remedies," "restitution," or
damages "measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms of the
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new guidance concerning the section's injustice requirement is supplied in
the comments.'5 6 Little is said, however, about the type and amount of reli-
ance required for recovery under the new section,15 7 or about the possibility
that promissory estoppel is becoming an independent theory of recovery. 58
The new RESTATEMENT does provide some guidance on another subject
that concerned us earlier: the possibility that reliance on an indefinite prom-
ise may make that promise enforceable. Section 34(3) declares that "[a]ction
in reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate
even though uncertainty is not removed."' 5 9 Also, Illustration Ten to the
new section 90, an obvious take-off on Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
suggests that only reliance damages are recoverable in such cases. 16°
The Hoffmans of the world, however, appear to have fared far better
promise." Id. comment d. Full-scale enforcement "is often appropriate," but "the same fac-
tors which bear on whether any relief should be granted" are also relevant to determining the
nature of the relief to be granted. Id. The same comment also cautions that "damages should
not put the promisee in a better position than performance of the promise would have put
him" unless "there is unjust enrichment of the promisor." Id.
156. Satisfaction of the... [injustice] requirement may depend on the reasonableness
of the promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in relation to
the remedy sought, on the formality with which the deterrent and channeling
functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the
extent to which such other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the pre-
vention of unjust enrichment are relevant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 90 comment b (1981). On the deterrent and
channeling functions of form, see generally Fuller, supra note 14.
157. Comment b does make the "definite and substantial character [of the promisee's reli-
ance] in relation to the remedy sought" a factor for consideration in the court's determination
whether injustice can only be avoided by enforcement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS section 90 comment b (1981). The same comment also contains language suggesting
that the amount of reliance required varies by type of case. Id. ("reliance need not be of
substantial character in charitable subscription cases, but must be in cases of firm offers and
guaranties"). It has been argued that contemporary courts often require little or no tangible
reliance in promissory estoppel cases. See Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1985). For an
example of such a case, see the discussion of Jones v. East Center for Community Mental
Health, Inc. in supra note 132.
158. In fact, such signals as exist are contradictory. Comment a says that section 90
"states a basic principle which often renders inquiry unnecessary as to the precise scope of the
policy of enforcing bargains," but comment d affirms that a "promise binding under this sec-
tion is a contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 90 comments a & d
(1981).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 34(3) (1981).
160. 10. A, who owns and operates a bakery, desires to go into the grocery busi-
ness. He approaches B, a franchisor of supermarkets. B states to A that for
$18,000 B will establish A in a store. B also advises A to move to another town
and buy a small grocery to gain experience. A does so. Later B advises A to sell
the grocery, which A does, taking a capital loss and foregoing expected profits
from the summer tourist trade. B also advises A to sell his bakery to raise capi-
tal for the supermarket franchise, saying "Everything is ready to go. Get your
money together and we are set." A sells the bakery taking a capital loss on this
sale as well. Still later, B tells A that considerably more than an $18,000 invest-
ment will be needed, and the negotiations between the parties collapse. At the
point of collapse many details of the proposed agreement between the parties are
unresolved. The assurances from B to A are promises on which B reasonably
should have expected A to rely, and A is entitled to his actual losses on the sales
of the bakery and grocery and for his moving and temporary living expenses.
Since the proposed agreement was never made, however, A is not entitled to lost
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under the new RESTATEMENT than have the Streichs because those who rely
on illusory promises apparently do not receive the protection afforded those
who rely on indefinite promises. Section 90 refers to a promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to trigger reliance by the promisee, and
appears under the heading: "Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or For-
bearance.' 161 A Reporter's Note to one of the comments to section 90 refers
the reader to Section Two and its comments for the meaning of the term
"promise."' 162 Unfortunately that section's definition of promise appears to
exclude illusory promises. 163 This appearance is confirmed by a comment to
Section Two' 64 and is reaffirmed by comments to sections 34 and 77.165 A
few notes of ambiguity, however, are struck by an illustration to section 90
which is plainly patterned after a well-known estoppel case 166 and by a Re-
porter's note to that section, 167 both of which can be read as suggesting that
profits from the sale of the grocery or to his expectation interest in the proposed
franchise from B.
Id. § 90 illustration 10 (emphasis added).
161. Id. § 90.
162. Id. § 90 comment a Reporter's Note.
163. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made." Id.
section 2(1) (emphasis added). Comment b tells us, without helping very much, that "[a]
promisor manifests an intention if he believes or has reason to believe that the promisee will
infer that intention from his words or conduct." Id. comment b. As Ian Macneil has ob-
served, section 2(1) "seems merely a Gertrude Steinian 'a promise is a promise is a promise.'"
I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 6 (1980).
164. Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional
with the "promisor" whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in
other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise. Although such
words are often referred to as forming an illusory promise, they do not fall
within the present definition of promise. They may not even manifest any inten-
tion on the part of the promisor. Even if a present intention is manifested, the
reservation of an option to change that intention means that there can be no
promisee who is justified in an expectation of performance.
Id. section 2 comment e.
165. Comment b to section 34 says that "[i]f one party to an agreement is given unlimited
choice, that party may not be a promisor (see Comment e to section 2), and the contract may
fail for want of consideration." Id. section 34 comment b. Comment a to section 77 says that
"[w]ords of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the 'prom-
isor' do not constitute a promise" and do not amount to consideration. Id. section 77 com-
ment a.
166. The case is Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See supra note 92 for
a discussion of Goodman. The illustration in question reads as follows:
A applies to B, a distributor of radios manufactured by C, for a "dealer
franchise" to sell C's products. Such franchises are revocable at will. B errone-
ously informs A that C has accepted the application and will soon award the
franchise, that A can proceed to employ salesmen and solicit orders, and that A
will receive an initial delivery of at least 30 radios. A expends $ 1,150 in prepar-
ing to do business, but does not receive the franchise or any radios. B is liable to
A for the $, 150 but not for the lost profit on 30 radios.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 90 illustration 8 (1981) (emphasis added).
167. The Reporter's Note to comment a, in addition to referring to section 2 for the mean-
ing of the term "promise," also invites readers to compare a number of authorities, starting
with Goodman v. Dicker and concluding with Henderson, supra note 29, at 364. The latter
reference is almost certainly to the following passage:
When a court finds that a bargain promise is indefinite or illusory or that it lacks
mutuality, it is really saying that the theory of consideration, as applied to the
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reliance on illusory promises can sometimes be enforced through estoppel.
III. ALTERNATIVE DEVICES FOR PROTECTING RELIANCE
ON ILLUSORY PROMISES
From a pro-reliance viewpoint, at least, the facts of Streich and several
other cases discussed in the preceding section argue for using promissory
estoppel to enforce illusory promises. Despite the increasing use of promis-
sory estoppel throughout this century, however, it is generally unavailable in
this context. The scattered cases explicitly using the doctrine to enforce illu-
sory promises hardly represent mainstream thinking on this subject. Also,
despite a few equivocations, even the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) is generally
hostile to this particular application of estoppel.
Even if the stance of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) were completely nega-
tive, however, one would not expect such a prohibition to limit the expan-
sion of the reliance doctrine for very long. The first RESTATEMENT did not
curb the inherently expansionist tendencies 168 of the reliance doctrine, 169
and there is no reason to suppose that its successor will limit these tenden-
cies either. 170 Should the next RESTATEMENT (if there is a third RESTATE-
MENT) expressly sanction the application of promissory estoppel to illusory
promises? Since the rationalization of extant case law is still one function of
particular facts, has not been satisfied. If the court then proceeds on the theory
of promissory estoppel, the necessary implication is that the bargain require-
ment is not as essential in exchange transactions as orthodox doctrine would
have us believe. Rather, detrimental reliance emerges as the decisive factor; the
promise itself is no longer as significant as the harm it precipitates. The cases of
unenforceable bargains-whether for lack of agreement, indefiniteness of lan-
guage or lack of mutuality of obligation-clearly demonstrate that when reliance
is justifiable and serious, the promise requirement of Section 90 is not difficult to
satisfy. (emphasis added).
168. "[B]y its very nature, the principle stated in section 90 defies all attempts to confine it
within rigid categories." Knapp, supra note 1, at 78. See also supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
169. On the evolution of promissory estoppel in the period between the two RESTATE-
MENTS, see supra notes 49-64, 88-104, 115-122 and accompanying text. Particularly instruc-
tive in this regard is the use of promissory estoppel to circumvent the writing requirement of
the statute of frauds. The first RESTATEMENT limited this application of estoppel to "ancillary
promise" cases, those in which the promisor had promised to reduce his main promise to
written form. See supra notes 40, 43; Metzger, supra note 49, at 1427 & n.364. But this did
not prevent courts from going beyond the ancillary promise limitation, see Metzger, supra note
49, at 1428-29, and the second RESTATEMENT sanctioned the expansion, see supra note 151
and accompanying text. Nor have the courts hewn too closely to the language of section 90
when the imperatives of justice dictated otherwise. As Professor Feinman has observed, many
cases in which promissory estoppel has been applied do not fit the elements of section 90:
"Often a promise is not explicit, definite, or complete, or the reliance is not substantial, neatly
linked to the promise, or clear." Feinman, supra note 9, at 689.
170. In this perception we are not alone. Professor Charles Knapp has suggested that the
new reliance sections in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) "do no more than indicate the current
high-water mark of reliance theory being applied in contract cases. The tide is still coming in,
and we can confidently expect additional applications in the future." Knapp, supra note 1, at
77. In the same vein, Knapp also observed that by the time the impact of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) is felt, section 90 "may well have transformed the face of contract law in ways
undreamt of by its drafters-or its revisers." Id. at 79.
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the RESTATEMENTS, 171 a body of decisions in which courts protect reliance
on illusory promises under various legal rubrics could bolster the case for
using promissory estoppel to enforce such promises. Much as Arthur Corbin
induced the inclusion of section 90 in the original RESTATEMENT by demon-
strating the existence of innumerable cases using various rationales to pro-
tect reliance on donative promises, 172 a similar body of illusory promise case
law could impel promissory estoppel's explicit application to such illusory
promises. Such case law does, in fact, exist. The decisions expressly protect-
ing reliance on illusory promises are merely the tip of a much larger iceberg
composed of cases in which reliance on illusory promises is protected by a
variety of other, less controversial means. This section examines the differ-
ent devices the courts have used to accomplish this result, and suggests how
promissory estoppel might better serve this end.
A. Manipulation of the Agreement
Courts in this century have employed a variety of interpretative strategies
to render illusory promises binding. These include expansively interpreting
seemingly illusory promises to render them real obligations, 173 implying the
existence of a promise designed to make the initial promise binding,' 74 and
holding that performance of an illusory promise removes it from the illusory
category.175 For example, it has long been held that an unfettered right to
171. On the different thrusts of the two contracts Restatements, see generally Speidel, supra
note 83.
172. See supra note 42. Apparently, however, Williston did much of the initial system-
atizing spadework here. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, section 2.13, at 73 for the observation that
"[i]n recent years... courts have tended to respond by reading the apparently illusory promise
so that it is not illusory." See also Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939)
(noting that in manipulating form contracts courts can "reject enforcement by one side for
want of 'mutuality,' though allowing enforcement by the weaker side because 'consideration' in
some other sense is present").
174. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, at 75; G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 77.
The classic example is Cardozo's decision in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88,
118 N.E. 214 (1917). There, the plaintiff Wood sued for breach of an agreement giving him the
exclusive right to market the defendant's fashion designs. The defendant argued that the
agreement was unenforceable because it imposed no duties on Wood, and the appellate divi-
sion agreed, finding it to be "void for lack of mutuality." 177 A.D. 624, 627, 164 N.Y.S. 576,
578 (1917). The court of appeals reversed, finding an implied promise by Wood to use "rea-
sonable efforts" to market the defendant's designs. 222 N.Y. at 92, 118 N.E. at 215. The
result in Wood is now enshrined in sales law. See U.C.C. section 2-306(2) (1978), which pro-
vides: "A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of
goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts
to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale."
175. See, e.g., Redd v. Woodford County Swine Breeders, Inc., 54 Ill. App. 3d 562, 566,
370 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1977); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of First Church of
Deliverance, 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 220, 365 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (1977); J. MURRAY, supra note
15, section 90, at 193 (once performance has been completed, "a unilateral contract [is] formed
with one right in the plaintiff who had already performed and one correlative duty in the
defendant who had received the benefit of performance"). Note that here we are dealing with
reliance by the author of the illusory promise, which is then used to overcome the promisee's
defense that no consideration has been given for the promisee's return promise. This is the
reverse of the situation that is our focus: the case in which the recipient of the illusory promise
relies upon it to his detriment.
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cancel by the promisor renders his promise illusory. 1 7 6 Yet any limitation
on the power of cancellation will remove the promise from the illusory cate-
gory.' 77 Where such a limitation is missing, courts have often strained to
find one, 178 or have found some other means to justify enforcement where
enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice. 79
Where no explicit limit on the promisor's power to terminate is manifest,
courts have restricted that power by implying a promise to give reasonable
notice before cancellation.' 80 The desire to protect reliance has also led
176. See, e.g., Allington Towers North, Inc. v. Rubin, 400 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. App. 1981)
(addendum to sales agreement giving buyer "absolute and unfettered right to cancel" at any
time before closing rendered buyer's obligation illusory); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109,
section 2.14. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 77 comment a (1981)
(purported promise making performance entirely optional with promisor is not a promise and
is not consideration for a return promise).
177. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975) (limita-
tions on unilateral right to cancel prevent promise from being illusory); Stem & Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 148 Conn. 527, 531, 172 A.2d 614, 616 (1961) (power of both parties to
cancel upon giving written notice does not render promises illusory); David Roth's Sons, Inc.
v. Wright & Taylor, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (limitations on lessor's
unilateral right to cancel lease furnish adequate consideration for lessee's promise to lease);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 77 illustration 5 (1981) (principal's reserva-
tion of right to terminate agency relationship on 30 days' notice does not render obligation
illusory); A. CORBIN, supra note 109, section 164 (power to cancel by notice given for some
stated period does not render obligation illusory); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, section
2.14 (same); G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at 77 (problem of illusory promise laid to rest by
saying that if promisor has agreed to any limitation on his future freedom of action, however
slight, promise is real, not illusory). The brevity of the notice period is not an issue due to the
traditional rule that courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 109, section 2.14.
178. See infra notes 180, 188 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Kowal v. Day, 20 Cal. App. 3d 720, 98 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971); Tilbert v.
Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933). In Kowal, the court enforced an option
against the seller despite the buyer's unilateral right to cancel. There was evidence of signifi-
cant buyer reliance, but as it was unbargained-for, it could not amount to consideration. 20
Cal. App. 3d at 725-26, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The court found sufficient consideration, how-
ever, in the fact that the buyer had allowed the seller the use of an automobile during the
option period. Id. at 727, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
In Tilbert, an employee's widow was allowed to recover a death benefit despite the em-
ployer's attempt to cancel the program to cut costs. The death benefit plan expressly reserved
the right to cancel on notice and provided that the plan "constitutes no contract" and "confers
no legal rights." 116 Conn. at 360, 165 A. at 207. The plaintiff's decedent died in the early
hours of the morning when notice of cancellation was given to employees. The court found
consideration for the plan in the benefits Eagle had received from its employees (Eagle's state-
ment to employees on inauguration of the plan outlined the benefits it hoped to receive), and in
the fact that plaintiff's decedent had remained with Eagle for seven years after receiving the
certificate. Id. at 361-62, 165 A. at 207-08. The court concluded by finding that the employer
had the right to cancel the plan, but found the attempt to cancel ineffective in this particular
case. Id. 363-64, 165 A. at 208. Tilbert, and Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318,
264 N.W. 385 (1936), a somewhat similar decision, have been characterized as cases where
employer death benefit programs "which were unenforceable as contracts by their express
terms were treated as contracts in order to avoid the otherwise harsh result of depriving an
employee's beneficiary of accrued death benefits." Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1
Ill. App. 2d 514, 519, 117 N.E.2d 880, 882 (1954).
180. This requirement has found its way into modern sales law. The U.C.C. now provides
that: "Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event
requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispens-
ing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable." U.C.C. section 2-
309(3) (1978). The explanatory comment to the section provides:
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some courts to limit the times when the power to terminate an agreement
can be exercised.' 8 ' This tendency is especially apparent in the so-called
"Missouri rule" line of cases,' 8 2 which limit the traditional rule that con-
tracts of indefinite duration are terminable at any time by holding that
franchise agreements which involve a large investment by the dealer and
which exist indefinitely cannot be terminated until after a reasonable period
of time has elapsed.' 8 3 This entitles the dealer to a 'fair opportunity' to
recoup his expenditures 1 84 The Missouri rule plainly seeks to protect dealer
Subsection (3) recognizes that the application of principles of good faith and
sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination
of a going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to
seek a substitute arrangement. An agreement dispensing with notification or
limiting the time for the seeking of a substitute arrangement is, of course, valid
under this subsection unless the results of putting it into operation would be the
creation of an unconscionable state of affairs.
Id. comment 8. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) directs readers to this section after noting that
"an agreement dispensing with notification may be unconscionable and invalid." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 77 comment d (1981). Two prominent commenta-
tors have observed of section 2-309(3) that "by imposing a reasonable notice requirement,
consideration, along traditional lines of thinking, is supplied." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 109, section 4-17, at 163.
Well before the U.C.C. was promulgated, courts imposed such limitations by interpretation,
at times in the face of express contract language attempting to reserve the right to terminate at
any time without notice. See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1945). In Sylvan Crest, the Second Circuit reversed a judgment for the govern-
ment based on a cancellation clause giving it the right to cancel its order "at any time." Id. at
643. While doing so, the court said that in construing the agreement a "presumption should be
indulged that both parties were acting in good faith." Id. This meant that the government's
"acceptance" should be interpreted "as a reasonable business man would have understood it":
namely, that the government would accept and pay for rock unless it gave the plaintiff notice
of cancellation within a reasonable time. Id. at 644. Of Sylvan Crest it has been observed that
while the decision "accords with business convenience and effectuates the agreement of the
parties," it is difficult to say that "plaintiff bargained for notice of termination in exchange for
his promise to supply trap rock." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 109, section 4-17, at
162. Instead, in Sylvan Crest and in "similar cases, the presence of such a bargain is quite
doubtful and the finding of consideration on such a premise seems to be a fiction designed to
effectuate the parties' agreement." Id.
181. Modern sales law distinguishes "termination" from "cancellation." Termination oc-
curs "when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an end to the
contract otherwise than for its breach." U.C.C. section 2-106(3) (1978). Cancellation occurs
"when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other." Id. section 2-106(4).
Many of the authorities cited herein, however, have not made this distinction and we have
used the terms interchangeably. In every case, however, we are referring to "termination" of
an agreement in the modern sense of the term.
182. See, e.g., Cambee's Furniture v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 173 (8th
Cir. 1987); Berryfast, Inc. v. Zeinfeld, 714 F.2d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 1983); Lockewill, Inc. v.
United States Shoe Corp., 547 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 1976); Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber
Engineered Prods., 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956); Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935,
938-39 (4th Cir. 1955); Beebe v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 218, 117 S.W.2d 624,
629 (1938).
183. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967
DUKE L.J. 465, 479-80.
184. Dealers relying on agreements of indefinite duration "may expend large sums
purchasing franchise equipment and otherwise preparing for performance." Hillman, supra
note 70, at 630. Some expenditures of this kind may not be salvageable upon termination
because they are tailored to the franchise in question. Examples of such expenditures include
monies spent on spare parts inventories with no resale value, signs containing the franchisor's
logo, and "single purpose" facilities and equipment. Gellhorn, supra note 183, at 467 & n.5,
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reliance interests, 85 and its kinship to promissory estoppel is obvious. I8 6
The protection the rule gives relying dealers is limited, however. The
franchisor may avoid its operation by inserting provisions disclaiming any
liability for dealer reliance losses in the dealership agreement, or by incorpo-
rating short, specific minimum duration periods into the agreement. 8 7
For reasons stated above, placing specific minimum time limits on
franchises or specifying a brief required notice of cancellation technically
supplies consideration and removes the franchisor's promise from the illu-
sory category. But to the franchisee terminated under such provisions, these
are likely to be distinctions without a difference. The loss experienced by
reliance will be the same as in cases where the franchisor terminates without
using either approach, and the underlying realities of the franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship that permitted the inclusion of such language will also
remain the same. Some courts have recognized this and have employed
modem contract doctrines of good faith and unconscionability to protect
dealers who rely on such de facto illusory promises. As the following sec-
tions demonstrate, these doctrines now constitute major alternative avenues
for compensating reliance on both true and de facto illusory promises.
473 & n.27, 519. Terminated dealers can also experience losses by foregoing other business
opportunities in reliance on the continued existence of their dealership. Hillman, supra note
70, at 630. While such losses are obviously somewhat speculative because courts cannot be
sure that the franchisee actually would have availed herself of the foregone opportunity or that
it would have been profitable, Professor Hillman argues that they should be considered in
contract cessation cases when they are not too remote or speculative. Id. at 631. He also
argues that courts should consider the franchisee's anticipated profits, since franchisee reliance
expenditures "are an investment for a future return; if that return is denied, the relying party is
harmed by not having invested elsewhere." Id. at 632.
185. Professor Henderson has observed that "there is little doubt that Section 90 signifi-
cantly reinforces the various reasons for reimbursement of a dealer's reliance losses" in such
cases. Henderson, supra note 29, at 363. He also asserted that "[s]o long as a dealer restricts
his lawsuit to expenses actually incurred, Section 90 will apparently allow recovery without
opening the Pandora's box of problems relating to the general enforceability of dealership
agreements." Id at 364.
186. Gellhorn, supra note 183, at 482. See also Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration,
Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 137-38 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979) ("reasonable duration envisioned by the [Mis-
souri] doctrine is quite short and the minimum duration may be eliminated contractually").
187. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 109, section 149 (promissory words not nullified by
fact that promise conditional on event within promisor's power "if at the same time he im-
pliedly promises to make (a] reasonable effort to bring the event about or to use good faith and
honest judgment in determining whether or not it has in fact occurred") (emphasis added);
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 369, 387-88 (1980) ("implication of good faith" now renders enforceable many agree-
ments otherwise unenforceable due to definiteness or mutuality requirements). See also Farns-
worth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 670 (1963) (function of good faith to allow judges
to imply terms in the parties' agreement)[hereinafter Good Faith]. On the implication of good
faith as furnishing consideration, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 77
illustration 10 (1981) (party's reservation of right to accelerate payment of debt "at will" lim-
ited by U.C.C. section 1-208 requirement of good faith, and therefore his "surrender of the
unconditional right to demand immediate payment is consideration").
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B. Good Faith
1. In General and in Contract Negotiations
One of the methods by which courts have fleshed out otherwise illusory
promises in order to render them enforceable has been to imply a promise or
duty on the part of the promisor to act in good faith. 188 Thus, good faith has
been used to limit the promisor's power to terminate an agreement, 189 to
qualify a clause conditioning the promisor's duty to perform on his personal
satisfaction with the promisee's performance, 19° to require a buyer whose
purchase obligation is contingent on obtaining satisfactory financing to make
good faith efforts to obtain such financing, 191 to restrict a party's power to
set a price for performance,192 and to limit the quantity that can be delivered
or demanded in output and requirements contracts.193 Indeed, both the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) 19 4 and the Uniform Commercial Code 195 now recog-
nize a general duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of
contracts.
The increased importance of good faith has been attributed to the reduced
specificity in contract terms resulting from modern contracting practices.196
The concept of good faith has also been linked to various modem principles
of "contractual morality"' 197 and characterized as a safety valve for judges to
fill gaps and manipulate rights and duties otherwise available under rules of
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 34 comment b (1981) ("discre-
tionary power granted by a commercial contract must be exercised in food faith"); id. section
205 comment e ("abuse of power.. .to terminate the contract" cited as violation of good faith
obligation). At times, this limitation has been implied despite clear contract language to the
contrary. See Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co., 40 Misc. 2d 501, 504, 243 N.Y.S.2d
503, 506 (1963) (party's contract right to terminate at "absolute discretion" interpreted as "a
discretion based upon fair dealing and good faith").
189. "[C]ourts have interpreted the language of satisfaction provisions so as to impose a
requirement of fair dealing on the promisor and thus avoid leaving too much to the promisor's
discretion." Farnsworth, supra note 85, at 246. For some extraordinary examples, see id. at
246 n.ll.
190. See Mezzanote v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. 11, 17, 200 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1973).
191. See U.C.C. section 2-305(2) (1978) ("A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price for him to fix in good faith.").
192. See id. section 2-306(1) ("A term which measures the quantity by the output of the
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur
in good faith. .. ").
193. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 205
(1981).
194. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." U.C.C. section 1-203 (1978).
195. See Pratt, supra note 110, at 417-18 for the assertion that such new contracting prac-
tices forced courts to modify classical contract doctrines to embrace the greater uncertainty
typical of modern agreements. This, Pratt argues, led to the evolution of the concept of good
faith and to "an altered image of contract, one in which the relationship between the parties
was closer to a fiducial one than to that of unrelated individuals in a free market." Id. at 419.
196. Summers, supra note 37, at 811 (good faith is "ofa piece with explicit requirements of
.contractual morality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various equitable princi-
ples"). Professor Summers also argued that the good faith principle "symbolizes a commit-
ment to the most fundamental objectives a legal system can have-justice, and justice
according to law." Id.
197. Id. at 812.
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law or specific contract language.1 98 Good faith is employed to reward the
trust,199 satisfy the reasonable expectations of contracting parties,2°° and to
enforce the spirit of deals. 20'
Despite its widespread application, however, the parameters of the good
faith obligation have eluded successful definition. The U.C.C. attempts to
define the concept,202 an approach eschewed by the RESTATEMENT SEC-
OND. 203 Professor Summers argues that the drafters of the RESTATEMENT
SECOND took the proper course, because the general requirement of good
faith is "not appropriately formulable in terms of some general positive
meaning.. .; rather, it function[s] as an excluder to rule out a wide range of
heterogeneous forms of bad faith. '' 2°4 Others, however, have found cause
for concern in the amorphous nature of the good faith duty, which is seen as
an invitation to arbitrary judicial decision making 205 that could cause uncer-
198. Because contracting parties do not contract with those they do not trust to
some extent, a dependent party will have reason to rely on the good faith of a
discretion-exercising party. Such reliance plausibly is based on the simple belief
that the party with discretion in performance will keep the contract....
Burton, supra note 187, at 392.
199. Good Faith, supra note 187, at 669 (good faith obligation characterized as "resulting
in an implied term... requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that
another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations").
200. Summers, supra note 37, at 827.
201. The general Code definition of good faith is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned." U.C.C. section 1-201(19) (1978). A higher standard is imposed on
merchants. Id. section 2-103(l)(b) ("honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade").
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 205 comment a (1981) states that:
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies
somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a con-
tract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
203. Summers, supra note 37, at 819.
204. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 620 (ex-
pansive interpretation of good faith "subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforce-
ment"); Hillman, supra note 104, at 876 (good faith principle "has been criticized for
unleashing a wave of judicial moralism, produced by the unbridled power that the concept
confers on the courts"). Professor Hillman goes on to suggest that the reason good faith
"takes on so many different meanings in different contexts [is] because at base it is nothing
more than a requirement of fairness-a definition so broad as to be virtually meaningless." Id.
at 877. Instead of relying on good faith, he argues that lawmakers should craft specific rules
"when the type of conduct that is unfair-in bad faith-in a given area is apparent" in order to
avoid "the potential of good faith to permit inconsistent and arbitrary decisions." Id. at 878.
205. "Existence of a broad principle, judicially applied and not capable of disclaimer by
bargaining, introduces an element of uncertainty that is likely to increase risks and raise costs
at the contract formation stage." Gillette, supra note 204, at 651.
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tainty,2°6 impose unbargained-for obligations,20 7 and increase costs. 208 For
these reasons, promissory estoppel seems superior to good faith as a device
for protecting reliance on illusory promises. Although the "injustice" re-
quirement of section 90 is far from a model of precision, 2°9 its other elements
combine to render the section arguably more definable, and therefore less
susceptible to abuse, than the good faith requirement.
Another advantage of promissory estoppel over the good faith obligation
springs from the contexts in which the good faith obligation normally ap-
plies. However much they may lack in precision, one thing about the U.C.C
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) formulations of good faith is quite clear: they
impose a duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of the con-
tract, not in its formation or negotiation stages. 210 A comment to the good
faith section of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) suggests a role for promissory
estoppel and unconscionability in such cases. 211 This suggestion is consis-
tent with the claims that Hoffman represents an intrusion of the good faith
principle into the negotiations context, 212 and that reliance-based damage
206. Id. at 620 (expansive interpretation of good faith "extends the responsibilities of com-
mercial actors beyond bargained-for risk allocations").
207. Id. at 632 (if good faith is "used to police the substantive fairness of a transaction or to
convert commercial actors into [their] brothers' keepers," the costs of interpretation, adminis-
tration, and remedy may "multiply to an unacceptable level"). But see Burton, supra note 187,
at 393 (good faith performance doctrine enhances economic efficiency by reducing contracting
costs such as negotiating and drafting contracts, and gathering information about trustworthi-
ness of contract partners).
208. However, the comments to the revised version of section 90 offer some assistance here.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 193-194. See also Good Faith, supra note 187, at 239 (reluctance of
courts to find a general obligation "that would preclude a party from breaking off negotia-
tions" supported by Code and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) formulations of general duty of good
faith which, "at least by negative implication," do not extend to negotiations); Gilette, supra
note 204, at 627 n.47 (obligation to negotiate in good faith "is conspicuously absent" from
U.C.C. section 1-203).
210. This Section, like Uniform Commercial Code section 1-203, does not deal with
good faith in the formation of a contract. Bad faith in negotiation, although not
within the scope of this Section, may be subject to sanctions. Particular forms of
bad faith in bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to contract, mu-
tual assent and consideration and of rules as to invalidating causes such as fraud
and duress. See, for example, sections 90 and 208 [unconscionability section].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 205 comment c (1981) (emphasis added).
211. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. See also Kessler & Fine, Culpa in
Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REV. 401, 408 (1964) [hereinafter Kessler & Fine], which discusses the German
doctrine of culpa in contrahendo (fault in negotiating), and observes that "[n]otions of culpa in
contrahendo and good faith have clearly given rise to many concepts applicable during the
negotiation stage, such as the notions of promissory estoppel and implied in fact collateral
contract, which have been employed in order to protect reasonable reliance on a promise."
This nexus between good faith and reliance was observed long ago by Professor Fuller when he
noted that in some section 90 cases "we are not 'upholding transactions' but healing losses
causes through broken faith." Fuller, supra note 14, at 811. Professor Summers has observed
that promissory estoppel, good faith, and implied promises all can play a similar role in miti-
gating the otherwise harsh effects that may flow from the mechanical application of more
specific principles. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 198 (1968).
212. See Kessler & Fine, supra note 211, at 402 (Jhering, originator of culpa in con-
trahendo, suggested that party who has relied on validity of contract to his injury should re-
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awards are uniquely appropriate in negotiations cases. 2 13 Thus, promissory
estoppel may be the doctrine of choice in situations where negotiations have
yielded an illusory promise that provokes precontractual reliance, where the
promise cannot readily be rendered substantial by traditional methods,
21 4
and where the general duty of good faith is inapplicable because its alleged
breach occurred during those negotiations.
2. Good Faith and Contract Terminations
Where an ongoing contractual relationship exists, good faith principles
have been employed to limit a party's power to terminate existing contracts
of indefinite duration,21 5 and even to prevent the nonrenewal of a definite-
term dealership agreement. 216 All of the cases in question involved a dealer
whose tenure was sufficiently long to assure recovery of the start-up expenses
protected by the Missouri rule.217 Interestingly enough, two of these cases
exhibit additional elements of reliance beyond those normally encountered
in dealer termination cases,218 and the third displays judicial awareness of
the reliance losses that even long-term dealers may experience upon termina-
tion.219 This consideration of reliance in the good faith context is hardly
surprising. The reliance losses a dealer faces upon his termination should
cover reliance damages, not value of promised performance). See also supra notes 160, 166
and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 173-175, 180 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 69 N.J. 123, 130, 351 A.2d
349, 352 (1976); Reisman & Sons v. Snyder's Potato Chips, 32 Somerset Legal J. 3, 10 (C.P.
Somerset Cty. 1975).
215. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978).
216. See supra notes 182-81 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 214. In Reisman, the plaintiff pretzel distributor had given up other
sources of supply in response to recent assurances by the defendant manufacturer that it would
supply all of plaintiff's requirements. 32 Somerset Legal J. at 5. In addition to good faith, the
court also justified its decision by referring to promissory. estoppel and U.C.C. sections 2-
309(2) and (3). Id. at 10-12.
In Bak-A-Lum, the defendant manufacturer's representatives had concealed their intention
to terminate the plaintiff's exclusive dealership, allowing the plaintiff to commit to a significant
expansion of its warehouse facilities and inducing it to place a major order on the eve of the
termination announcement. 69 N.J. at 128, 351 A.2d at 351.
218. See supra note 215. Razumic involved a dealer who had represented the plaintiff oil
company for 20 years and whose dealership agreement was silent on the issue of renewal. In
denying the plaintiff possession of the station, the court observed that:
[A] franchisee such as Razumic builds the goodwill of both his own business and
Arco. In exchange, an Arco dealer such as Razumic can justifiably expect that
his time, effort, and other investments promoting the goodwill of Arco will not
be destroyed as a result of Arco's arbitrary decision to terminate their franchise
relationship.
480 Pa. at 378, 390 A.2d at 742. The court also noted that "[a] contrary conclusion would
allow Arco to reap the benefits of its franchisees' efforts in promoting the goodwill of its name
without regard for the franchisees' interests." Id. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J.
402, 409, 307 A.2d 598, 602 (1973) for the observation that "[i]t is the incumbent dealer who
has everything to lose since, even if he had another location to go to, the going business and
trade he built up would remain with the old station."
219. Gellhorn, supra note 181, at 495-96. A similar approach has been adopted in employ-
ment-at-will cases by those courts holding that employees cannot be discharged for bad faith
reasons, but that good faith and fair dealing do not require that the employer have good cause
for the discharge. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 378, 710
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reasonably be expected to influence courts' perceptions of the termination's
justice and justice, after all, presumably is what good faith is all about.
The extent of the protection afforded terminated dealers by the good faith
duty is far from clear, however. For example, it has been suggested that the
good faith test applies only to terminations for wrongful motives,220 and that
for this reason a good faith limitation on termination neither protects dealers
against franchisor overreaching nor prevents unjust enrichment. 221 For the
same reason, good faith may not protect many forms of franchisee reliance.
Although many good faith cases have not inquired into the motives of the
terminating party, an important constraint has been placed on the good faith
idea by those courts holding that good faith cannot override an express ter-
mination provision in the agreement. The best known case of this kind is
probably Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 222
In Corenswet, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a preliminary
injunction against Amana's termination of Corenswet, an exclusive distribu-
tor of seven years' standing.2 23 It did so despite holding the district court's
finding that Corenswet's termination was "arbitrary and without cause" was
not clearly erroneous. 224 The Fifth Circuit instead based its holding on the
agreement's specific provision that either party could terminate the agree-
ment at any time without cause. 225 The court recognized that dealers tend
to pay insufficient attention to termination provisions while negotiating a
P.2d 1025, 1040(1985); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551-52
(N.H. 1974).
220. Gellhorn, supra note 181, at 504. Professor Gellhorn appropriately observed of such a
conception of good faith that:
Analytically, the terminating party's motives are unrelated to the harshness of
the bargain or of [sic] its effect. Motives have no relationship to the parties'
relative bargaining power. Nor would the application of the good faith test be
affected either by whether the dominant party was misusing its power or by
whether termination would have unduly harsh effects on the terminated party.
Id. He subsequently argued that a termination "for the sole purpose of furthering the eco-
nomic self-interest of the terminating party" would probably not be in bad faith, despite the
fact that "such a termination may nevertheless have substantial unfair effects on the termi-
nated party's business." Id. at 505.
221. 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co.,
576 F. Supp. 774, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
222. Note that this means Corenswet had probably recouped its start-up reliance costs at
the time of termination.
223. 594 F.2d at 131. Over the seven year period, Amana's representatives had repeatedly
praised Corenswet's performance. Id. at 132. The court later concluded that there was ample
evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the real reason for
Amana's decision to terminate was Amana's president's animosity toward the president of
Corenswet's parent company. Id. at 133.
224. Id. at 132.
225. "As is so often the case with franchise and distributorship relationships, the termina-
tion clause in the standard form contract was of little interest or concern to the parties so long
as things were going well between them." Id. at 132. On this point, see also Gellhorn, supra
note 181, at 466 (when dealer contracts are drafted parties tend to focus on questions of per-
formance, paying little attention to the problem of termination); Phillips, Unconscionability
and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimer, 62 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 199, 241 (1985) (because
many disadvantageous form contract clauses deal with contingencies that may never occur,
there is a natural disposition toward discounting their importance and hoping for the best
while accepting the standard form terms).
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dealership agreement.226 The Court also recognized Corenswet's significant
and successful investment in marketing Amana's products,227 and the fact
that Amana's past conduct may have created a reasonable expectation that
Amana would not arbitrarily terminate a distributor. 228 Nonetheless, it con-
cluded that the contract by its terms allowed Amana to do S0.229 Such a
contractually reserved right, "however distasteful, may [not] be lost through
nonuse .... except in cases of conduct of the sort giving rise to promissory
estoppel. ' '230 It is unclear whether the latter reference was to the kinds of
extraordinary reliance that can sometimes arise in termination cases, 231 or to
oral assurances that an "any reason" termination clause would be exercised
only for cause.232 What is crystal clear about the decision is the determina-
tion of the Fifth Circuit not to join the courts which have held that good
faith can limit a franchisor's power to terminate under an unqualified termi-
nation clause.233 The court criticized the use of good faith as a tool for
policing distributorship terminations,234 and stated that unlike unconsciona-
bility, good faith cannot properly be used to override or cancel express con-
tract terms.235 The proper question in such cases, the court opined, is
"whether public policy forbids enforcement of a contract clause permitting
unilateral termination without cause,"' 236 a question it saw as properly ad-
dressed in unconscionability terms.237 Corenswet had raised, but not pur-
226. Corenswet had invested over $1.5 million developing the market for Amana's prod-
ucts, with the result that annual sales of Amana products had increased from $200,000 in 1969
to $2.5 million in 1976, and the number of retail outlets selling Amana's products had in-
creased from six to seventy-two over the same period. 594 F.2d at 132.
227. Id. at 136. There was, in fact, testimony that Corenswet "understood" that the con-
tract would not be terminated arbitrarily. Id. at 135-36. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that
Corenswet would have made so significant an investment in developing a market for Amana's
products had it believed that Amana would interpret the termination clause literally.
228. Id. at 136.
229. Id.
230. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
231. Note that any proffered evidence of such assurances would probably be confronted at
trial with an objection based on the parol evidence rule. On the interaction between promis-
sory estoppel and the parol evidence rule, see generally Metzger, supra note 49.
232. See 594 F.2d at 136, where the court discusses such cases.
233. Id. at 138. Here the court cited Professor Gellhorn's discussion of good faith's sup-
posed emphasis on the terminating party's improper motivation, see supra notes 219-220 and
accompanying text.
234. 594 F.2d at 138.
235. Id. at 138. The court plainly believed that the answer to this question was not invaria-
bly affirmative. Instead, it argued, such clauses can permit "parties to end a soured relation-
ship without subsequent litigation." Id. Moreover, bilateral clauses such as the one at issue
can give the distributor "an easy way to cut the knot should he be presented with an opportu-
nity to secure a better distributorship from another manufacturer." Id. at 139. The latter
argument, however, ignores the losses even long-term dealers suffer on termination and the
benefits that may devolve to manufacturers in the event of termination. See supra note 218 and
accompanying text.
236. "It is the office of the unconscionability concept, and not of the good faith concept, to
strike down 'unfair' contract terms." Id. at 139. Public policy, the court continued, abhors
"economic overreaching-the use of superior bargaining power to secure grossly unfair advan-




sued, an unconscionability argument,238 and in the eyes of the court,
Cornswet's proper unconscionability-based remedy for inadequate notice of
termination 239 was not the preliminary injunction it had requested. 24°
Corenswet has attracted criticism, 241 and the court can be faulted for giv-
ing insufficient weight to Corenswet's probable understanding of the termi-
nation clause, and for giving too much weight to literal contractual language
that was in all probability the product of unequal bargaining power.242
Corenswet does, however, implicitly raise another problem associated with
using good faith as a tool for policing illusory and de facto illusory promises:
the remedy to be afforded the victim of bad faith behavior. Denying a
franchisor the right to terminate could force the parties to continue a rela-
tionship that at least one of them is unwilling to continue. 243 Human nature
being what it is, the victorious franchisee may thereafter be confronted with
grudging, dilatory performance by the franchisor, or with a franchisor who
is determined to amass sufficient evidence to justify termination. Similar
238. The court framed the unconscionability issue as one of inadequate notice due to the
language of U.C.C. section 2-309(3). Id. For the text of section 2-309(3) see supra note 180.
239. Id. Here the court referred to Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs. v. Drewrys Ltd., 256
Iowa 899, 909-10, 129 N.W.2d 731, 737 (1964), a termination case in which no notice was
given and the terminated distributor was allowed to recover damages based on the profits it
would have made during a reasonable notice period.
240. Hillman, supra note 70, at 648 n. 198 (Corenswet decision incorrect due to Amana's
"unfair tactics, the material harm to Corenswet on termination, and the profitability of the
agreement to Amana").
241. On the disparity of bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees, see Gell-
horn, supra note 183, at 468. See also the discussion of Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, infra note
242.
Where courts have evidence that the termination clause at issue is the product of genuine
bargaining, they are likely to sustain it under all of the theories discussed here. For an excel-
lent example, see Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985).
There, a mine operator sought to prevent a mineral leaseholder from exercising a clause al-
lowing either party to terminate upon 90 days' notice. The termination clause allowed the
plaintiff to recover all of its advance expenditures upon termination, so at least some of the
plaintiff's reliance was protected. Id. at 737. More important, however, was the fact that the
termination provision was the product of extensive negotiation by the parties and had been
inserted into the contract at the insistence of plaintiff's predecessor in interest to secure tax
benefits for both parties. Id. at 741. The court acknowledged that other courts have used the
good faith duty to restrict unambiguous termination provisions, but said that this was only
true in "special circumstances": cases that "involve a special element of reliance... [or] where
one party has traditionally held vastly superior bargaining power." Id. at 740 (citation omitted;
emphasis added)). Given the absence of either special reliance or a disparity of bargaining
power, the court gave full effect to the contract language. Id. at 741.
242. Several courts have recognized this potential problem. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Mari-
nello, 63 N.J. 402, 411, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (1973) (holding that public policy prohibits
franchisor from terminating or failing to renew franchise in absence of showing that dealer has
substantially failed to perform his obligations under agreement and recognizing that result of
this is that franchise "would have legal existence for an indefinite period"); Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 385-86, 390 A.2d 736, 746 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., concurring)
(expressing concern that majority decision preventing bad faith refusal to renew dealership
agreement "in effect excises the three-year term provision from the contract and reads into the
contract a duty on the franchisor-lessor to keep the agreement in force indefinitely, with no
provision of any sort for termination"); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 474,
223 S.E.2d 433, 440 (1976) (court finds 10-day cancellation provision to be unconscionable,
but says "we cannot and do not leave the parties with an irrevocable relationship").
243. See supra notes 115-134 and accompanying text.
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problems may attend employment-at-will cases 2 " and cases like Streich v.
General Motors Corporation.245 Should employers be forced to hire or indefi-
nitely retain employees they do not want, or should buyers be required to
purchase (or pay damages for failing to purchase) some judicially-deter-
mined quantity of goods where the agreement contains no quantity
specification? 24 6
Such problems are not the inevitable or unavoidable consequences of using
good faith to police illusory and de facto illusory promises. The remedy for
breach of the good faith duty is sufficiently indeterminate to embrace various
kinds of cash damages,247 and some courts have allowed the recovery of
such awards without disturbing the termination itself.24s The point is that
reliance-based damages seem ideally suited to many such cases. 249 They
244. See supra notes 138-148 and accompanying text.
245. Because the agreement contained an estimate of the number of valves that G.M.
would order, the court in Streich presumably could have required G.M. to give Streich the
benefit of his bargain by awarding him the profit he would have made on the sale of that
number of valves. But it is not difficult to imagine a case with similar facts, but without the
stated quantity estimate. If the disappointed plaintiff was to be the sole supplier, then damages
presumably could be calculated based on the number of parts the buyer in fact bought from
other suppliers. If, however, the buyer entered similar agreements with several would-be sup-
pliers, such a resolution would not be available. In such a case, a court might attempt to arrive
at a quantity estimate by a pro rata division of actually occurring demand, but even such a
strategy would be unavailing in a case where the buyer had entered such agreements as a hedge
against a potential need that never materialized.
246. A comment to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) merely states that "[t]he appropriate
remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith... varies with the circumstances." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, section 205 comment a (1981). Professor Speidel has noted
that these "circumstances" are not clearly stated in the new RESTATEMENT and concludes
that "the remedy might be less but not more than the expectation interest." Speidel, The
Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163, 180 (1983).
247. See, e.g., Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., 69 N.J. 123, 131, 351 A.2d 349,
352 (1976) (termination of long-term dealer without adequate notice; damages awarded for lost
profits dealer would have earned during reasonable notice period); Reisman & Sons v. Snyder's
Potato Chips, 32 Somerset Legal J. 3, 5 (C.P. Somerset Cty. 1975) (termination without notice
allowed; issue is proper period for notice and damages resulting from failure to provide ade-
quate notice). A similar approach has been adopted in many employment-at-will cases. See,
e.g., McKinney v. Nat'l Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (D. Mass. 1980) (employee
discharged in violation of good faith duty allowed to recover damages; method of calculation
unclear); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 105-06, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1258
(1977) (employee discharged in bad faith to avoid payment of sizeable bonus allowed to re-
cover amount of bonus due); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 134, 316 A.2d 549,
552 (1974) (employee discharged in bad faith allowed to recover damages based on lost wages);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220, 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975) (same).
248. See the last quotation from Professor Henderson, supra note 185. See also the discus-
sion, supra note 212 and accompanying text and Hillman, supra note 70, at 639 (in contract
cessation cases, reliance damages appropriate if parties' position on cessation is unclear).
249. See Shattuck, supra note 73, at 940-44. See also Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97
(Tex. 1965) for the following statement:
[I]n cases such as we have before us, where there is actually no contract the
promissory estoppel theory may be invoked, thereby supplying a remedy which
will enable the injured party to be compensated for his foreseeable, definite and
substantial reliance. Where the promisee has failed to bind the promisor to a
legally sufficient contract, but where the promisee has acted in reliance upon a
promise to his detriment, the promisee is to be allowed to recover no more than
reliance damages measured by the detriment sustained. Since the promisee in
such cases is partially responsible for his failure to bind the promisor to a legally
sufficient contract, it is reasonable to conclude that all that is necessary to
[Vol. 44
PR OMISSOR Y ESTOPPEL
may adequately protect the promisee's foreseeable reliance250 without doing
as much violence to the promisor's interests as an expectancy-based award
or the forced continuation of an unwanted relationship. Promissory estoppel
is much more commonly associated with reliance than is the doctrine of
good faith, and its use in the illusory promise context might alleviate the
uncertainty some courts feel about the proper treatment of such cases. Such
use might also induce some courts to afford relying promisees a measure of
protection by providing a middle ground between a complete denial of such
protection and the forced continuation of an unwanted relationship.25I The
case for formal recognition of promissory estoppel gains additional momen-
tum if, as has been suggested above,252 the prospect of promisee reliance
losses plays a major role in shaping judicial intuitions about the equities of
the case.
2 5 3
This is not to suggest, however, that promissory estoppel is a perfect de-
vice for policing illusory and de facto illusory promise cases. Some forms of
promisee reliance, though real, may be difficult to prove.2 54 In addition,
some types of cases may not be amenable to resolution by the reliance princi-
ple. 255 Finally, relying promisees are sure to be confronted with the argu-
ment that their reliance was unreasonable given the language of the
agreement, and therefore they are undeserving of protection. This Article
addresses this important objection to promissory estoppel's application to
illusory promises in the next section.2 56 Before doing so, however, it exam-
ines the doctrine of unconscionabiity, the other major device by which
courts have protected reliance based on illusory promises.
achieve justice is to put the promisee in the position he would have been in had
he not acted in reliance upon the promise.
The degree to which a promisee is "responsible" for the illusory or de facto illusory nature of
the agreement that results from the conscious choice of a promisor with superior bargaining
power is, of course, highly debatable. However, even in such circumstances it is difficult to say
that the promisor "consented" to a contract in any meaningful sense of the term.
250. In addition, this course of action might make unnecessary the judicial filling-in of
quantity terms in cases like Streich. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
251. See supra text following note 218.
252. To further pursue this point, envision a contract termination case, a Streich-like case,
or an employment-at-will case in which the facts plainly indicate that the terminated party will
suffer no significant reliance losses upon termination. We believe most courts would allow
termination under such circumstances regardless of what legal theory they purport to apply.
253. See infra notes 374-375 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 404
(1977). There, the court held that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing limits the
operation of a provision in a medical malpractice policy giving the insurer the right to cancel
coverage upon 30 days' notice to the insured. Id. at 959, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The plaintiff
alleged that the canceled insurance was unavailable at competitive rates from solvent, nonhaz-
ardous insurance carriers. Id. at 955, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 406. In such a case, the absence of
feasible alternative suppliers means there are no obvious reliance losses upon which to premise
the application of promissory estoppel. While the application of good faith can serve to pre-
vent policy cancellation, such cases really concern the availability of professional liability in-
surance, an issue more amenable to legislative resolution than to judicially crafted solutions.
255. See infra notes 325-48 and accompanying text.





The doctrine of unconscionability, which has been described as "an all-
purpose weapon against contract problems, ' 257 apparently originated in eq-
uity25s8 when chancellors refused to grant specific performance to contracts
"such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other."259 Its
recent rise to prominence has been linked to the twentieth-century rise of the
form contract 26° and the way standardized forms undermined the assump-
tions underlying classical contract law. 261 As one of the family of doctrines
that "restrict unbridled freedom of contract and protect against numerous
forms of advantage taking, '262 its primary function "has been to rescue from
hard bargains those who are grossly disadvantaged in their dealings with
sharp, or at least more sophisticated, traders. '263
Earlier in this century, courts grappling with the then unfamiliar problems
created by the abuse of form contracts sought to avoid unfair outcomes by
"using existing, technical devices such as interpreting ambiguous language
against the drafter or striking a contract for lack of mutuality or failure of
consideration. ' ' 264 This approach distorted contract precedents and aggra-
vated consent problems by encouraging drafters to redraft with even more
detailed contract language. 265 These problems motivated the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code to draft section 2-302266 and thereby "make it
possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses
257. See, e.g., Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065,
1065 & n.3 (1986); Phillips, supra note 225, at 212; Note, Commercial Decency and the Code-
The Doctrine of Unconscionability Vindicated, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1968).
258. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)).
259. See Mallor, supra note 257, at 1069-70.
260. Id. at 1069. On the relation between standardized forms and freedom of contract, see
also infra notes 352-61 and accompanying text.
261. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE section 4-1, at 147-48 (2d ed. 1980).
262. Mallor, supra note 257, at 1066; Note, supra note 257, at 1144-45.
263. Mallor, supra note 257, at 1069-70.
264. Id. at 1070.
265. Id. U.C.C. section 2-302(1) reads as follows:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) includes a very similar provision. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS section 208 (1981).
266. U.C.C. section 2-302 comment 1 (1978). This comment goes on to observe that:
In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of lan-
guage, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations
that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract. This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly on the
unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a con-
clusion of law as to its unconscionability.
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which they find to be unconscionable. ' 267 The doctrine has grown and been
applied in many situations not governed by article 2 of the U.C.C., and has
thus "entered the general law of contracts. '2 68
But while section 2-302 gives the courts formidable powers to deal with
unconscionable contracts or clauses, it provides precious little assistance in
identifying the objects of such powers. Nowhere in its extensive definitional
sections does the Code define unconscionability. A comment to section 2-
302 purports to provide some guidance,269 but two prominent Code com-
mentators have judged the effort useless.270 This, the commentators suggest,
is in part due to the fact that it is not possible to define unconscionability.
"It is not a concept, but a determination to be made in light of a variety of
factors not unifiable into a formula."' 27 ' This imprecision exposes the uncon-
scionability doctrine to the same criticism previously leveled against the
good faith principle:272 that its vagueness invites inconsistent and arbitrary
judicial decision making. 273
Nonetheless, it is possible to delineate some of the factors that are likely to
be considered relevant in an unconscionability analysis. Most cases in which
courts have found a contract or clause unconscionable have involved ele-
267. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 109, section 9-39, at 322. See also id. at 322-
23; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, section 4.28, at 308. In general, the factors used by
courts to decide such cases resemble those used in cases proceeding under U.C.C. section 2-
302.
268. Comment 1 says that the relevant inquiry is "whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable" at the time the contract was created.
U.C.C. section 2-302 comment 1 (1978). The comment goes on to say that "[tihe principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of the disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." Id. (citation omitted).
269. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 261, section 4-3, at 151. They explain this
judgment as follows:
To the extent that the comment [comment 1] gives a message, it is an ambiguous
one, for it acknowledges that the court in some circumstances has the power to
overturn various clauses in a contract, but it assures us that the purpose is not to
disturb the allocation of risks. How a court can refuse to enforce certain con-
tracts which were formerly enforceable and not at the same time disturb the
allocation of the risk because of superior bargaining power, is difficult to see.
Id.
270. Id. (emphasis in original). This has not, of course, prevented some courts from trying
to define the term. E.g., Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982) (unconscionability is "the rubric under
which the judiciary may refuse to enforce unfair or oppressive contracts in the absence of fraud
or illegality"); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(unconscionability means "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party").
271. See supra notes 204-7 and accompanying text.
272. For the most thorough and sustained attack of this kind on record, see generally Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
273. See, e.g., Mallor, supra note 257, at 1073; Phillips, supra note 225, at 218. Some
authorities have suggested, however, that certain types of contract terms are sufficiently egre-
gious to be decreed unconscionable even absent any procedural irregularities. See, e.g., Mallor,
supra note 257, at 1073 & n.74; Phillips, supra note 225, at 219.
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ments of both274 procedural and substantive unconscionability. 275 Given the
disparity of roles of bargaining power in unconscionability cases, claims by
consumers unsurprisingly tend to enjoy far greater success than claims by
merchants.276 In some situations, however, small businesses dealing with
larger entities have successfully employed the unconscionability doctrine as
well. 2
77
Thus, although courts occasionally fail to distinguish between them,278
some formal differences between the good faith principle and unconsciona-
bility are apparent. Unconscionability plainly applies to the contract forma-
tion process, 279 while the good faith duty theoretically applies only to the
274. These terms were coined by Professor Leff, and have been employed in most subse-
quent commentary. Procedural unconscionability refers to defects in the bargaining process
(also called "bargaining naughtiness" by Leff). Leff, supra note 272, at 487. Substantive un-
conscionability refers to "evils in the resulting contract." Id. On the interaction between the
two, Professor Mallor observes:
Procedural and substantive unconscionability usually go hand in hand. The
concept of unfair surprise implies the coexistence of procedural and substantive
unfairness. A contract might present a term in fine print, for example, and not
be unfairly surprising. If the parties expected the term in that type of contract,
the term would not be surprising, and, if the term were necessary to protect the
drafting party's legitimate interests, it would not be unfair. Oppression also con-
notes substantive as well as procedural unfairness. Disparity of bargaining
power becomes oppressive only when one of the parties obtains an unfair term
through its bargaining advantage.
Mallor, supra note 257, at 1073. See also Jordan, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62
MINN. L. REv. 813, 815 n.l 1(1978) for the following observation:
[T]he emerging consensus seems to be that unconscionability is not directed at
bargaining per se: terms written on the head of a pin about which no bargaining
is possible will be enforceable if they are reasonable and in line with ordinary
expectations. Unless the terms produce hardship, the bargaining process need
not be scrutinized.
275. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 261, section 4-2, at 149; Mallor, supra
note 257, at 1066.
276. See, e.g., Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 151 Mich. App. 598, 391 N.W.2d 760
(1986); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976). See also the cases cited in Mallor, supra
note 257, at 1066 n. 11. White and Summers state that "when a businessman is poorly edu-
cated, 'over a barrel,' or is the victim of fine print, a court may invalidate a clause that other-
wise would stand up between ordinary businessmen." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
261, section 4-9, at 172.
277. See Hillman, supra note 104, at 857 n.45 (courts generally have not tried to distin-
guish good faith and unconscionability). See also Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for
Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REV.
1198, 1198 n.3 (1988) for the following observation:
[C]ourts use a set of terms, such as "good faith," "bad faith," "fiduciary duty,"
and "unconscionability" in business cases as a means to demand of businessper-
sons a higher level of trustworthiness, fairness, and honesty in the conduct of
business affairs than is the case when traditional common law contract and tort
doctrines are the rule of decision in commercial cases.
Professor Shell also sees a similar role for promissory estoppel, arguing that "[c]ourts seem to
approve of promissory estoppel in part because the doctrine advances moral and ethical ideals
of market behavior." Id. at 1206.
278. "Unconscionability.. .is a limitation on freedom of contract that allows the courts to
police the bargaining relationship and to override the manifested intention of the parties in the
interests of justice." Burton, supra note 187, at 371-72 n.14.
279. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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performance and execution of the contract.280 Also, while the good faith
duty plainly can be used to protect against injustice arising from unequal
bargaining power, it is far more likely to be applied to transactions between
equals than is the unconscionability doctrine. 28'
2. Unconscionability and Promissory Estoppel in Illusory Promise Cases
Is unconscionability, as some commentators have argued, 282 the ideal de-
vice for policing dealer termination cases? Certainly it has been used effec-
tively by some terminated dealers283 and has also been applied with telling
280. Unlike the unconscionability doctrine, however, weakness and strength in this
[good faith] context do not refer to the substantive fairness of the bargain or to
the relative bargaining power of the parties. Good faith performance cases typi-
cally involve arm's-length transactions, often between sophisticated business
persons. The relative strength of the party exercising discretion typically arises
from an agreement of the parties to confer control of a contract term on that
party. The dependent party then is left to the good faith of the party in control.
Burton, supra note 187, at 383-84. It should be noted, however, that virtually all of the case
types with which this article is concerned are situations in which the illusory or de facto illu-
sory nature of the agreement is the product of disparate bargaining power.
281. See Hillman, supra note 70, at 648; Gellhorn, supra note 183, at 508.
282. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 410, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (1973) (10-
day termination clause contrary to public policy); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va.
463, 474, 223 S.E.2d 433, 440 (1976) (10-day termination clause in gasoline dealer lease is
"unconscionable on its face"). The Marinello court held that Shell could not terminate or fail
to renew Marinello's franchise without proof that he had "failed to substantially perform his
obligations" under the agreement. 63 N.J. at 410-11, 307 A.2d at 603. The court stressed the
importance of dealer efforts to the success of the franchise, noting that "the personality and
efforts of the operator and the good will and clientele generated thereby are of major impor-
tance." Id. at 407, 307 A.2d at 601. This good will would be captured by the franchisor upon
termination. See the quotations from Marinello in supra note 218. Therefore, a dealer, "partic-
ularly if he has been operating the station for a period of years and built up its business and
clientele.. .cannot afford to risk confrontation with the oil company," a fact which allowed
Shell to "dictate its own terms." Id. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601. Thus, the provisions at issue
were "the result of Shell's disproportionate bargaining position and... grossly unfair." Id. at
409, 307 A.2d at 602.
In Donahue, the court similarly held a ten-day termination provision to be unconscionable
on its face, but said that "we do not find it necessary to base our holding upon a disparity in
bargaining power between Ashland and Donahue." 159 W. Va. at 474, 223 S.E.2d at 440.
Instead, the court observed that the contract was governed by the Code, under which "[t]here
is imposed upon both parties to a business transaction an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance or enforcement." Id. "[W]ithin that framework," the court continued, "defenses
may be made and proof may be offered in a manner sufficient to protect the commercial rights
of all parties whether they be economically strong or weak." Id.
283. See Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 151 Mich. App. 598, 391 N.W.2d 760 (1986).
There, Gianni, a small clothing manufacturer, had entered an agreement to supply women's
fall fashions to Gantos, a large retailer. The agreement included a clause giving Gantos the
right to "terminate by notice to Seller all or any part of this Purchase Order with respect to
Goods that have not actually been shipped by the Seller." Id. at 600, 391 N.W.2d at 761. The
clothes were to be delivered in early October. In late September, after Gianni had manufac-
tured, but not yet shipped, most or all of the order, Gantos terminated. Id. Gianni subse-
quently agreed to a 50% reduction in price if Gantos would accept the goods. The trial court
held that the price reduction agreement was invalid because the cancellation clause which
necessitated it was unconscionable. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, noting the
disparity of bargaining power between the parties and pointing out the significant reliance
losses Gianni faced if the agreement were upheld:
The [trial] court questioned whether a clause entitling one party to cancel at any
time even allowed for a contract to exist. The court pointed out that plaintiff
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effect to termination provisions in contracts for the sale of goods.28 4 But
unconscionability's essentially defensive thrust 28 5 means that the doctrine is
not commonly associated with an award of damages. 28 6 For this reason,
using unconscionability to police contracts with illusory promises raises the
same problems discussed earlier in the good faith context. Employing the
doctrine to block an unfair termination may force the parties to continue an
unwanted relationship in dealer termination cases, 287 or compel the courts to
supply a missing quantity term in cases like Streich v. General Motors
Corp.28 8
Some commentators have also expressed concern that unconscionability is
too "contract term oriented,"2 89 and therefore vulnerable to "superconscion-
ability" strategies290 that seek to block unconscionability claims by the use
made the goods in question especially for defendant pursuant to this order. Not-
ing the fast-changing character of the women's fashion industry, the court distin-
guished this case from situations where cancellation means the seller merely
replaces the goods back on the shelf to await another order. Here, a last-minute
cancellation places the seller in the untenable position of absorbing the loss or
negotiation with the buyer to accept the goods at a reduced price.
Id. at 602, 391 N.W.2d at 762 (emphasis added). The emphasis on reliance here is obvious, the
clear implication of the emphasized language being that termination would have been allowed
had it come before Gianni made a substantial beginning in preparing the order, or had the
ordered goods been readily resalable to other customers. That the provision was the product
of disparate bargaining power was confirmed when the defendant's buyer testified at trial that
such clauses were standard practice in the garment industry because "the buyer in our industry
is in the driver's seat." Id.
284. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 261, section 4-1, at 148.
285. "[I]t appears that the doctrine is in the nature of an affirmative defense and is not
usually intended as a basis for damage recovery." Id. section 4-3, at 150. Of course, in some
cases refusing to enforce the contract or striking a provision of the contract results in a damage
award. See, e.g., the discussion of the Gianni case in supra note 283.
286. See supra note 242 and surrounding text. The Donahue court recognized this problem
when it stated that "[h]aving determined that the ten-day termination provision is unconscion-
able, we cannot and do not leave the parties with an irrevocable relationship." 159 W. Va. at
474, 223 S.E.2d at 440. The Marinello court, in contrast, seemed unconcerned that the effect
of its decision was that the dealer's franchise "would have legal existence for an indefinite
period." 63 N.J. 411, 307 A.2d at 603. This aspect of Marinello led one critic to complain that
"[i]f the effect of an unconscionability decision is to lock the parties into a lifelong relationship
quite contrary to original expectations, then a strong argument can be made that in attempting
to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, the law has itself become oppressive." Jordan, supra
note 274, at 841. Professor Gellhorn recognized this problem when he observed that even if a
termination provision is held unenforceable, the court should allow termination on reasonable
terms. Gellhorn, supra note 181, at 515. He also argued that fairness may dictate allowing
termination, but modifying the termination clause to enable the dealer to "reduce his losses on
termination by phasing out his business." Id. at 518-19. This, he argued, would alleviate the
harsh effects of termination on dealers while freeing manufacturers from an unwanted contin-
ued relationship. Id. at 519.
287. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
288. See Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability---Franchisee Remedies for Termination,
29 Bus. LAW. 227, 231 (1973).
289. For a discussion of such strategies, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 261,
section 4-7, at 164-66; Mallor, supra note 257, at 1078-79, 1087.
290. See, e.g., Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1982). There,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a trial court decision enforcing a unilateral termination clause in a
contract between a manufacturer of slow-cookers and the supplier of the internal cooking shell
used in the cookers. The agreement consisted of 22 purchase orders, the last eight of which
were canceled by the defendant. The court noted that the parties were both experienced pro-
fessionals, that the plaintiff had been on notice of the provision from the outset, and that the
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of highly detailed, specific, and conspicuous contract language designed to
prevent oppression and unfair surprise. Where contract language is the
product of real bargaining, decisions upholding the language are plainly
proper.291 But where such language merely notifies the victim of "the sad
state of his rights... at the outset," 292 it should only be given effect if the
result is not unconscionable. Despite this, parties who are considered
merchants 293 may be particularly vulnerable to a superconscionability strat-
egy because of the tendency by some courts to impose what amounts to a
presumption against unconscionability in contracts between merchants. 294
Courts also may be reluctant to use the unconscionability doctrine for any-
one who can be cast as an experienced business person.295
plaintiff knew that demand for the defendant's product was volatile. Id. at 396. The eight
canceled orders were interrelated and reflected this volatility. Id. Quite important for our
purposes is the court's observation that the agreement contained a provision obligating the
defendant to pay the reasonable costs of reaching a settlement in the event of termination.
This, the court said, "means expenses incurred under the contracts in question," which the
defendant had apparently already paid. Id. at 397. No further recovery for lost profits was
allowed because the plaintiff was bound by the express damage term in the agreement. Id.
Thus, under the facts of the case and the terms of the agreement the plaintiff here had in all
probability recovered any reliance losses upon termination.
291. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 261, section 4-7, at 165.
292. Under the Code, a "merchant" is:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill be attributed by his employ-
ment of an agent or or other intermediary who by his occupation himself out as
having such knowledge or U.C.C. section 2-104(1) (1978).
293. Mallor, supra note 257, at 1067.
294. See, e.g., Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980); Smith
v. Price's Creameries, Inc., 98 N.M. 541, 650 P.2d 825 (1982). In Zapatha the terminated
franchisee, a high school graduate with one year of college and some managerial experience,
had knowledge of the termination provision because the defendant's representative read the
contract to him and advised him to show it to his attorney. He was also advised, however, that
the terms of the contract were not negotiable. Given Zapatha's business experience, the fact
that the clause was not in fine print and had been pointed out to him by Dairy Mart's represen-
tative, and the fact that he had the opportunity to have the agreement reviewed by counsel, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that no unfair surprise existed and upheld the termi-
nation. 381 Mass. at 293-94, 408 N.E.2d 1376-77. Significant for our purposes is the court's
conclusion that the effect of the clause was not oppressive because Dairy Mart was obligated to
buy back Zapatha's equipment and unsold inventory upon termination, thus compensating
him for his reliance losses. Id. at 295, 408 N.E.2d at 1377.
The decision in Smith, however, demonstrates that the prospect of serious reliance losses
will not necessarily shield an allegedly sophisticated party confronted with a plainly worded
termination provision. There, the plaintiffs faced the loss of their investment of almost $99,000
when the defendant terminated their franchise less than seven months after its creation. The
plaintiffs argued that during negotiations leading up to their agreement the defendant's repre-
sentative had claimed that the distributorship would continue indefinitely if they adequately
performed their duties. The court, however, upheld the termination due to the presence in the
agreement of a clause giving either party the right to terminate upon 30 days' written notice
"for any reason." The court emphasized Mr. Smith's background and education (three and
one-half years of college, and work experience as a policeman, an insurance salesman, and a
finance company employee), the plaintiffs' knowledge that the clause was in the contract, their
opportunity to consult an attorney, and their failure to attempt to negotiate any of the provi-
sions of the agreement. 98 N.M. at 544-45, 650 P.2d at 828-29.
295. On the other hand, as we have observed elsewhere, promissory estoppel's "injustice"
requirement is sufficiently broad to embrace the kinds of factors typically considered by courts
in unconscionability cases. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 546.
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Promissory estoppel, however, is not necessarily the only way to prevent
the problems just recounted. After all, the unconscionability concept is suffi-
ciently broad to enable a determined court to do justice to relying promisees
without unduly penalizing promisors in most cases. 296 In addition, promis-
ees using promissory estoppel to recover for terminations based on clearly
worded contract clauses will be confronted with the argument that their reli-
ance is unreasonable, 297 an argument that will gain credence if the promisee
is putatively sophisticated.298 It seems plain, however, that the prospect that
one party will suffer serious reliance losses often plays a major role in judi-
cial determinations that a contract or clause is unconscionable.299 Likewise,
in many cases where unconscionability arguments have failed, serious reli-
ance losses were not at issue. 300 Further, one may reasonably assume that
some courts which have left a party with a substantial reliance loss by failing
to heed unconscionability arguments30 1 have done so, at least in part, be-
cause they viewed reliance-based awards as unavailable in unconscionability
claims and were reluctant to force a party into an unwanted relationship of
indeterminate duration. To the extent that these observations are accurate,
the administration of justice is likely better served by a formal recognition of
the importance of reliance in such cases.
IV. WHY NOT PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL?
A. The Case for the Application of Promissory Estoppel's Application to
Illusory Promises
The discussion in the preceding section justifies our contention that a
party's reliance on illusory promises has long been protected under a variety
296. See infra notes 325-348 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Berryman v. Kmoch, 221 Kan. 304, 309, 559 P.2d 790, 794 (1977) (expertise
of realtor promisee a factor in denial of recovery on option promise unsupported by
consideration).
298. See Hillman, supra note 70, at 648 (extent of franchisee's reliance losses and expected
gains are elements of unconscionability determination because they indicate whether termina-
tion clause destroyed essence of franchisee's deal, although reliance element requires investiga-
tion of the parties' positions at time of contract breakdown, a determination that courts do not
generally recognize as a function of unconscionability). See also Gellhorn, supra note 181, at
517-18 (suggesting that proper unconscionability test in termination cases should consider
"whether the harm which will or is likely to result to the terminated party from enforcing the
termination provision is proportional to the harm which will or is likely to result to the termi-
nating party if the provision is not enforced"). For case examples, see the discussions of Mari-
nello and Gianni Sport, supra notes 282, 283.
299. See Gellhorn, supra note 183, at 517 (one reason why unconscionability has not been
more liberally applied to termination cases is that losses to terminated party have not seemed
severe, especially when compared to potential losses to manufacturer if termination provision
not enforced). See also the discussions of Cardinal Stone and Zapatha, supra notes 290, 294,
respectively.
300. See, e.g., the discussion of Smith v. Price's Creameries, Inc., supra note 294.
301. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. See also G. GILMORE, supra note 19, at
56 (noting the tendency for many cases protecting reliance to be "underground" cases); Bar-
nett & Becker, supra note 96, at 472-73 (arguing that the number of cases in which promissory
estoppel is effectively used to circumvent the statute of frauds is far higher than the number in
which it is overtly so used; in many such cases oral promises within the statute are enforced
and the statute is never mentioned).
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of legal doctrines. This finding is hardly surprising, given the moral and his-
torical claims of the reliance interest, its long history of covert protection, 30 2
the courts' tendency to justify their decisions in the most traditional way
possible,30 3 and their propensity to manipulate traditional contract rules to
achieve just results.304 But "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools. ' 305 Their
use often hinders the development of law,3° 6 and impairs the administration
of justice by causing confusion and unpredictability.3 0 7
The preceding section provided ample support for these generalizations in
the illusory promise context. As tools for protecting reliance on illusory
promises through manipulation of the agreement, good faith and unconscio-
nability suffer serious flaws. The protection afforded promisee reliance by the
Missouri rule, for instance, is easily defeated by including a disclaimer of
reliance losses or a minimum duration period in the agreement. 30  The good
faith doctrine is generally inapplicable to reliance occurring during contract
negotiations. a3 9 In addition, some courts say that relief for bad faith termina-
tion is possible only when the terminating party acted with wrongful mo-
tives, 310 a requirement which leaves some forms of promisee reliance
uncompensated. Cases like Corenswet Inc. v. Amana Refridgerator, Inc.,31
further restrict the use of good faith to protect reliance by holding that the
doctrine is unavailable where a contract cancellation occurs pursuant to an
absolute termination clause.3 1 2 Because recovery of damages is problematic
under both good faith and unconscionability, neither doctrine is an ideal
vehicle for awarding a terminated party the value of her reliance where the
equities of the case make this the most sensible result.3 13 Finally, both doc-
302. Pettit, supra note 59, at 592 (explaining why judges prefer unilateral contract analysis
to promissory estoppel, even though estoppel offers some advantages).
303. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 183, at 493 (noting the tendency of courts to use and
misuse rules of contract construction to aid abused party in franchise cases); Hillman, supra
note 104, at 853 (discussing ways courts have manipulated preexisting duty rule to produce
fair results); Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 702 (discussing semi-covert techniques for manipu-
lating form contracts to avoid injustice); Metzger, supra note 49, at 1401-03 (discussing judi-
cial manipulation of parol evidence rule).
304. Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 703.
305. Hillman, supra note 104, at 853. Llewellyn said of covert judicial tools that "since
they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either experience or authority in the needed
direction." Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 703.
306. [S]ince they [covert tools] purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor
are intended to, but are instead tools of intentional and creative misconstruction,
they seriously embarrass later efforts at true construction, later efforts to get at
the true meaning of those wholly legitimate contracts and clauses which call for
their meaning to be got at instead of avoided. The net effect is unnecessary
confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy, and evil per-
sisting that calls for remedy.
Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 703.
307. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
310. 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979).
311. See supra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 242-49, 284-87 and accompanying text.
313. However, this is not to say that the doctrine is perfectly adapted to protecting reliance
on illusory promises, or that good faith and unconscionability have no role to play in this area.
See, e.g., supra notes 246-55, 295-99 and accompanying text.
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trines are amorphous in the extreme, and for that reason should not be pre-
ferred when a superior alternative is available.
Promissory estoppel is such an alternative.314 Although the doctrine's el-
ements are hardly models of definiteness, 31 5 the doctrine certainly exceeds
good faith and unconscionability in this respect. Because promissory estop-
pel allows a reliance-based damage recovery in appropriate cases, 316 it pro-
vides courts an alternative to forcing an unjustly terminated party into an
unpromising relationship, or (in cases like Streich) fashioning a quantity
term out of whole cloth.3 17 As Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 318 makes
clear, promissory estoppel protects promisees who foreseeably rely to their
detriment during contract negotiations. Because it focuses on detrimental
reliance that is forseeable, the doctrine renders the motive of the promisor a
secondary consideration in deciding whether to award relief.319 In appropri-
ate situations, promissory estoppel could enable deserving promisees to re-
cover for reliance on promises containing either an absolute or a qualified
termination clause, and even for promises that disclaim liability for reliance
losses. In such cases, the usual elements of promissory estoppel recovery,
especially the foreseeable reliance and injustice tests, should usually be deter-
minative. 320 Finally, to its open-endedness, the latter test should enable
courts to accommodate the various miscellaneous factors321 that become rel-
evant in illusory promise cases.
As Justice Holmes once observed, "a body of law is more rational and
more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and defi-
nitely to an end which it subserves. .... ,,322 Here, the end in question is the
protection of foreseeable reliance on illusory promises, an end inarticulately
and haphazardly advanced by the doctrines discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. For these reasons, promissory estoppel is a much more straightforward
314. On the elements of promissory estoppel, see generally supra notes 44-48, 149-158 and
accompanying text (discussing the doctrine's formulations under the first and second Restate-
ments). Of these elements, only the broad "injustice" requirement is especially amorphous, and
even here the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) provides some guidance. See supra note 156 and ac-
companying text.
315. See, e.g., supra notes 80-81, 85, 92, 130, 160, 166 and accompanying text.
316. On these defects of good faith and unconscionability, see supra notes 242-250, 286-287
and accompanying text.
317. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
318. Where it is relevant, presumably, this factor could be considered under promissory
estoppel's broad "injustice" requirement.
319. Of course, the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance is likely to be a surrogate for
its foreseeability in many situations of this kind.
320. The most conclusive of these is likely to be the presence or absence of genuine bargain-
ing over the clause in question. In the absence of such bargaining, other important factors
would include the extent of the promisee's knowledge of the existence and import of the clause
at issue, the availability to the promisee of feasible alternative causes of action, indications that
the promisor benefited from the promisee's reliance, and the extent and nature of the prom-
isee's losses in reliance on the agreement.
321. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
322. See supra notes 11-112 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 82-84 and ac-
companying text (making the same argument in the indefinite promise context) and supra
notes 159-167 and accompanying text (discussing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)'S treatment of
these questions).
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and effective vehicle for realizing this goal. As noted earlier, 323 the main
technical bar to utilizing promissory estoppel in enforcing illusory promises
is the easily-dispensable formalism 324 that such statements by promisors are
not genuine promises capable of supporting promissory estoppel recovery.
Two other objections to promissory estoppel's deployment in the illusory
promise context, the unreasonableness of relying on such promises and the
denial of freedom of contract their enforcement entails, 325 at least are rele-
vant substantive objections to the doctrine's expansion. For this reason, this
Article concludes by examining each in turn.
B. The Reasonableness of Relying on Illusory Promises
Reliance on illusory promises, some argue, is unreasonable and therefore
undeserving of protection. There are two main thrusts to this contention.
The first and more general of the two is that the reasonableness of relying on
a promise depends heavily on that promise's legal enforceability. 326 The sec-
ond and more specific contention is that there is something particularly un-
reasonable about relying on an illusory promise.327 Both lines of argument
323. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal
Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant Theory about Law and Its Use, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 861, 868 n.4 (1981) (contrasting formalistic and nonformalistic views of law by,
inter alia, noting how "logic" of existing concepts controls the interpretation, application, and
extension of law in the former, and goals and "policy" control these processes in the latter).
Under formalism so regarded, the "logic" of a promise would seem to dictate that illusory
promises are not true promises and should not be enforced, since by their terms they bind the
promisor to nothing. To a nonformalist, on the other hand, the relevant "policy"-in this case,
protecting reliance--controls the question of enforceability. As should be obvious from the
discussion thus far, we are generally unsympathetic to formalism as just defined. The reason is
our agreement with Professor Summers that "[a] general theory of law that does not address
issues of value is. . .fundamentally incomplete." Id. at 875. But this does not preclude the
possibility that legal formalism may promote certain values-most notably, definiteness and
predictability in legal rules and the benefits to private planning flowing therefrom-and that
these may override or modify other policies in particular contexts.
324. See supra notes 86-87, 113 and accompanying text. Another relevant consideration is
the difficulty courts would face in fashioning damage awards if illusory promises were enforce-
able. See supra notes 85, 114 and accompanying text. To the extent that promissory estoppel
recoveries in illusory promise cases involve reliance losses, however, this objection seems moot,
for such losses do not depend for their computation on the terms of the promise.
325. [Wlhether a person has "reasonably" relied on a promise depends on what
most people would (or ought to) do. We cannot make this assessment independ-
ent of the legal rule in effect in the relevant community, because what many
people would do in reliance on a promise is crucially affected by their perception
of whether or not the promise is enforceable. A reliance theory, therefore, ulti-
mately does no more than pose the crucial question that it is supposed to an-
swer: is this a promise that should be enforced?
Barnett, A Consent Theory ofContract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275 (1986). See also Barnett
& Becker, supra note 96, at 446-47 (black letter rules of promissory estoppel "too circular to
have descriptive or predictive power: how can enforcement turn on the reasonableness of reli-
ance when the reasonableness of reliance will necessarily depend on enforceability?"); the quo-
tation from Professors Goetz and Scott in supra note 14.
326. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 362 n.96 (greater judicial resistance encountered by
those seeking to recover for reliance on illusory promises as opposed to indefinite promises "is
probably the result of the view that, while any reliance upon a wholly illusory promise is likely
to be unreasonable, reliance upon a promise which is merely incomplete may be quite
reasonable").
327. In rejecting these arguments, we are not asserting that the reasonableness of the prom-
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are unpersuasive for a number of reasons.
In the present context the argument derived from the legal unenforceabil-
ity of illusory promises seems circular. If the use of promissory estoppel to
enforce such promises depends on whether it is reasonable to rely on them,
and if this reasonableness depends on whether the law enforces them, the
fact of their general nonenforcement inevitably precludes using estoppel for
this purpose. 328 If this argument had held sway throughout this century,
promissory estoppel may not have gained recognition in the first place,329
and its various subsequent applications almost certainly would not have oc-
curred.330 Much the same objection applies to the argument that there is
something especially unreasonable about relying on illusory promises. For
example, promissory estoppel has been used to protect reliance in the face of
inconsistent contract provisions,33I and to protect reliance on implied
promises not part of the parties' agreement. 332 Is reliance on such promises
any more reasonable than reliance on illusory promises?
To say that something has been done, of course, is not to say that it should
have been done, and the success an idea enjoys is not an infallible test of its
quality. But the argument that the reasonableness of promissory reliance is
contingent on the promise's enforceability suffers from an additional flaw;
the argument rests on the assumption that parties know the law and shape
their behavior accordingly. 333 A wealth of historical experience suggests
isee's reliance is never a relevant inquiry in promissory estoppel cases. Indeed, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) expressly makes it a relevant inquiry. See supra note 156. Instead, our
remarks are directed toward the general argument that promissory estoppel should have no
application to illusory promises because reliance on such promises is inherently unreasonable.
328. Of course, as we have argued at length, such promises often are enforced through one
legal device or another. To whatever extent their enforceability would be apparent to a reason-
able promisee, the argument we are discussing is further undermined.
329. We say "may not" because the doctrine originated by generalization from a number of
discrete situations in which reliance was protected. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying
text. In many of these situations, though, the courts were twisting established doctrines to
protect reliance. For this reason, it is unclear whether the promisee could reasonably have
depended on the promise's enforceability in each individual context.
330. At the time promissory estoppel was held inapplicable to promises made in the bar-
gain context, for example, promises contemplating such a bargain were legally unenforceable
until a contract had been created. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Feinman,
supra note 9, at 685 (it was argued that "reliance on a promise in the bargain context could
never be reasonable-and therefore never be actionable-unless the promisee had actually con-
cluded the bargain with the promisor"). Yet promissory estoppel eventually came to serve as a
"consideration substitute" in such situations. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972); Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp.
612 (S.D. Cal. 1981). See also the cases cited in Fuller, supra note 14, at 811 n.16.
332. See, e.g., the discussion of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. at supra notes 60-64 and accom-
panying text. Professor Macneil has said of Drennan that it "can be read as holding that
reliance on something (industry patterns or common decency?) created the promise rather
than the other way around." Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 897(1978). He argues that under an emerging "relational" view of contract law parties' restitu-
tion, expectation, and reliance interests "[n]o longer are...bottomed primarily on defined
promises, nor are efforts necessary to squeeze them within promissory contexts." Id. at 898.
333. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107,
1109 (1984) (classical contract assumed everyone knows, or can fairly be taken to know, the
law); Feinman, supra note 105, at 844-45 (classical system of formal contract rules based on
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that this assumption is inaccurate in many cases. 334 Surely one of the rea-
sons reliance on otherwise unenforceable promises is protected is because
people do rely on such promises.335 What promisees rely upon is not the
legal enforceability of the promise, but rather the prospect that the promise
will be performed. 336 Such reliance is often the intended product of the
promise337 and is plainly foreseeable because it is a prerequisite to the prom-
isee's enjoyment of the fruits of the promise.338
behavioral assumption that people are highly responsive to incentive or threat of contract
rules).
334. "Contemporary and historical research suggests that people generally don't know or
don't care much about the rules of contract law and generally carry out their affairs with little
regard for them." Feinman, supra note 105, at 844-45. See also Eisenberg, supra note 333, at
1109 for the observation that "[i]n the real world.. .the empirical evidence--consisting of the
common experience of those trained in the law-strongly suggests that private actors, taken as
a class, have little or no significant knowledge of contract law." A superb historical example is
afforded by the statute of frauds, about which it was said over a century ago that "[i]n the great
mass of cases the contracting party is as unconscious of the existence of the Statute of Frauds
as of the pressure of the atmosphere." Stephen & Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of
Frauds, 1 L.Q. REV. 1, 3 (1885). Thus, these early critics of the Statute were moved to argue
that "[l]aws ought to be adjusted to the habits of society, and not to aim at remoulding them."
Id at 6.
335. "Experience has proved that promises [sic] all too frequently rely to their injury on
gratuitous promises. It is useless to argue that they should not rely where there is no consider-
ation for the promise. The uncontrovertible fact is that they do rely." Shattuck, supra note 73,
at 943.
336. "When a man enters into a contract he does not think of himself as bargaining for a
law suit. He relies upon the other party's undertaking in fact rather than upon the legal obli-
gation, if any, which that undertaking imposes." J. MURRAY, supra note 15, section 90, at
194-95. See also PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW, supra note 9, at 38, for the argument that
the promisee:
[D]oes not rely on the fact that a promise creates a binding obligation; he relies
on the speaker's intention to do what he has promised to do. If a promisor
intends, or thinks it probable that the promisee will so rely, and if he in fact does
so, he will suffer harm unless the promise is performed. The promisor will thus
have caused harm to the promisee, will have made his position worse, as a result
of, first making, and then breaking, the promise. Even if the promise was not
known to be binding, for example, in a society which does not recognize binding
promises, people will sometimes rely upon statements of intention (or various
other kinds of statements), and through such reliance, they will suffer loss.
Atiyah does not find this explanation totally satisfactory, however, because it takes no account
of the promisee's voluntary role in relying. d at 64-66 (emphasis in original). What is miss-
ing, he says, is "something which tells us whether the second person [promisee] was justified in
acting in the way he did." Id. at 66. That extra element, he argues, "is compliance with some
socially accepted values which determine when expectations and/or reliance are sufficiently
justifiable to be given some measure of protection." Id. at 68.
337. See, e.g., id. at 144 ("promises are given to induce people to act upon them"); Posner,
Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law in A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW 46, 46 (1979) (only economic reason promisor of gratuitous promise
makes promise instead of merely conferring benefit is "to induce performance of some sort by
the promisee; if reciprocal performance is not desired, there seems no reason to make a prom-
ise"). Certainly, some of the illusory promise cases previously discussed suggest that the
promisor expected to benefit from promisee reliance. See the discussions of the Jones, Spooner,
and Tilbert cases supra notes 132, 134, and 179 respectively. See also Boyer, supra note 39, at
884 (discussing cases in which promissory estoppel was used to enforce employer promises of
bonuses and pensions, noting the "benefits to an employer who is thus able to reduce his labor
turnover," and suggesting that this benefit gives courts added incentives to try to enforce such
promises).
338. This is plainly so of the case types we have been discussing. The new employer knows
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One may argue, however, that mere facts should not control what is essen-
tially a normative inquiry.339 Thus, it might be asserted that even though
many promisees rely on legally unenforceable promises, such promisees still
do not deserve protection because they failed to adequately inform them-
selves. The rugged individualism apparently underlying such a view,
34 ° of
course, is clearly not the dominant theme of twentieth century contract
law. 34' And it is subject to an even more pertinent objection-that those
parties who do know the rules and act accordingly are likely to be sophisti-
cated, economically powerful individuals or entities, and that such actors
may employ the rules to take advantage of the weak, dependent, or ill-in-
formed.3 42 This observation is particularly apposite to illusory and de facto
illusory promise cases, many of which result from the intentional exercise of
that the currently employed employee promised a new job will have to quit his old job in order
to assume his new duties. See supra notes 118, 126 and accompanying text. General Motors
knew that Streich would have to undertake expensive preparations if he was to be able to
supply it with air magnet valves. See supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text. See also I.
MACNEIL, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELA-
TIONSHIPS 70 (1971), for a discussion of the auto industry's common use of "blanket orders"
such as the one at issue in Streich. There, the following recorded interview between Professor
Stewart Macaulay and a Ford supplier is reproduced:
When you deal with Ford, you get a release which tells you to ship so many
items in January and gives an estimate on February and March. Ford is com-
mitted to take or pay for the February estimate even if it cancels. However, it is
not bound to take the parts estimated for March if it cancels in February. One
fabricates March parts at his own risk, but Ford tries to encourage its suppliers to
take this risk so there will be an inventory to handle sudden increased orders.
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the franchisor who signs a franchisee to an illusory or de facto
illusory franchise agreement plainly knows that the dealer must make the investment necessary
to sell the franchisor's product line and desires the dealer to make that investment.
339. Cf. the concluding remarks by Atiyah in supra note 336.
340. Chancellor Kent, for example, once asserted that the common law "does not go to the
romantic length of giving indemnity against the consequences of indolence and folly." J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 380 (1st ed. 1827), quoted in E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 109, section 4.14, at 247.
341. To take just one of many possible examples, today little remains of the traditional rule
that justifiable reliance is necessary for recovery in a fraud or misrepresentation case. See, e.g.,
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 109, section 9-15, at 280-81.
342. [A] special problem exists to the extent that [contract] rules are known and
used. Knowledge and use of contract law by commercial actors typically re-
flects disparities of economic position. Large enterprises and frequent partici-
pants in the marketplace have greater legal sophistication and can use it to the
detriment of those less well situated....
Feinman, supra note 105, at 845 (emphasis in original). See also Barnett & Becker, supra note
96, at 466, for the observation that:
The costs of formal limits on contract liability are higher (and the benefits
lower) for consumers than for merchants who engage repeatedly in the same
transactions. Consumers are less likely to be aware of formal limitations on
liability than are merchants. As a result, formal limits may surprise and disap-
point consumers' reasonable expectations; consumers are less likely than
merchants to learn to take advantage of, or to depend upon, formal limits.
The problem is not confined to consumers, however. See The Statute of Frauds and the
Business Community. A Re-Appraisal in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 Yale L.J. 1038 (1957).
This empirical study looked at actual business practice concerning the reduction of oral agree-
ments to written form. It found that large manufacturers were more likely than small manu-
facturers to demand and receive from customers written evidence of oral agreements. Id. at
1047. This difference in practice was attributed to the difference between large-scale and
small-scale business operations and to the lesser bargaining power of the small firm. Id. at
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greater sophistication or superior bargaining power.343 As our preceding
remarks suggest, such knowledgeable promisors may derive an advantage
from the promisee's failure to read or understand a complex form agreement
containing an illusory promise, or his failure to comprehend its legal impact.
Even where this is not the case, promisees may rely because they are eco-
nomically dependent on the promisor's business.344 In either situation, bas-
ing the unenforceability of illusory promises on the alleged unreasonableness
of the promisee's reliance is hard to reconcile with twentieth century con-
tract law's general tendency to protect weaker contracting parties.3 45 Ad-
mittedly, in some cases reliance on an illusory or de facto illusory promise
may result from a party's conscious and voluntary decision to assume the
known risks of the agreement because the potential benefits appear to justify
those risks.346 Where this is so, a court has no more business disturbing the
agreed-upon allocation of risk under promissory estoppel than it would
under unconscionability or good faith. But realities of contracting in the
modem world guarantee that many agreements will not be the products of
consent in the classical sense of the term.3 47 The doctrines of unconsciona-
bility and good faith,348 among others, bear ample witness to this fact.
C. Promissory Estoppel and Freedom of Contract
Portions of the preceding discussion suggest another objection to promis-
sory estoppel's application in illusory and de facto illusory promise cases:
that imposing liability on promisors in such situations violates freedom of
contract. But this is not the only possible freedom-of-contract-related argu-
ment against using the doctrine to enforce illusory promises. For some re-
cent commentators, liability based on promissory estoppel is not really based
on reliance, but rather can and should be viewed as a product of the parties'
assent. Because this assertion may undermine the extension of promissory
estoppel to illusory promises, this Article considers it after discussing the
first, more conventional, freedom-of-contract-based assertion.
1051 & 1054-55. For some further generalizations on these familiar subjects, see infra notes
352-61 and accompanying text.
343. As we have observed elsewhere, "[p]arties with superior bargaining power have been
known to retain the option of non-performance by creating long and complex 'agreements'
rendered illusory by a single clause, while effectively binding weaker parties through their
ignorance of the clause's effect and their need of the stronger party's business." Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 3, at 538.
344. Streich and Gianni Sport are obvious examples. See supra notes 137-48, 283 and ac-
companying text. See also Macneil, supra note 332, at 869 n.44 ("blanket orders" used in auto
industry not technically enforceable against manufacturer in absence of specific order; enforce-
ment mechanism based largely "on the desire of the supplier to continue doing business with
the manufacturer").
345. On this tendency, see infra notes 352-61 and accompanying text. In situations of the
second sort, moreover, the promisee's reliance is arguably quite reasonable, at least in a busi-
ness sense. Certainly it is at least as reasonable as Hoffman's reliance on Red Owl's promise of
a franchise.
346. The Cardinal Stone case discussed in supra note 290 is an example of such a case.
347. See infra notes 352-361 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 187-200, 256-67 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of
good faith and unconscionability).
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1. Promissory Estoppel as Violating Freedom of Contract
Using promissory estoppel to enforce illusory and de facto illusory
promises obviously violates freedom of contract. 349 In cases where the illu-
sory promise is intended, the liability imposed is liability to which the prom-
isor has not freely consented. Moreover, liability is imposed when the
.promisor clearly intended to avoid or limit it. Even so, it is unclear why
freedom of contract should outweigh the competing claim of the reliance
principle. In any event, the remarks in preceding sections suggest another
reason for rejecting this objection. One choosing to stand on freedom of
contract today is standing on an idea whose moral force has been eroded by
many of the social and legal developments of this century.
The notion that a contract is, and should only be, a product of the parties'
free wills was undermined quite early by the objective theory of contract 350
and by the contract interpretation process. 351 The most devastating assault
on the citadel of freedom to contract, however, came with the advent of form
contracting. Standardized contracts were often prepared by businesses with
greater bargaining power 35 2 and sophistication3 53 than those with whom
they dealt. These advantages were employed to defeat the expectations of
349. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 365 (application of promissory estoppel to indefinite
and illusory promises "limits powers traditionally exercised by offerors," raising danger that
traditional insistence on "clear promises, upon close attention to the reasonableness of conduct
in reliance, and upon external indicia of intent to be bound" will be discarded "to protect every
relying promisee"). Cf. Kniffin, Innovation or Aberration: Recoveryfor Reliance on a Contract
Offer, as Permitted by the New Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 23, 38-
39 (criticizing section 87(2) of the new Restatement, which makes an offer irrevocable if it
provokes reliance, as violating "the freedom to contract or not to contract").
350. That the objective theory of contract is divorced from the actual subjective intent of
the parties is evident from Learned Hand's classic statement of its effect:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany
and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops
that either party when he used the words intended something else than the usual
meaning which the law imposes on them, he would still be held, unless there
were mutual mistake or something else of that sort.
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). This gap between subjec-
tive and objective intent has led one observer to note that "[r]equiring the promisor's subjective
will to yield always, or almost always, to the promisee's reliance on the promisor's objective
manifestation of assent undermines the claim that contractual obligation is grounded in the
individual's will and bolsters the view that contractual obligations may be imposed rightfully
on unwilling parties." Barnett, supra note 325, at 274. See also PROMISES, MORALS, AND
LAW, supra note 9, at 15 (where Atiyah expresses surprise "that English common lawyers,
even in the nineteenth century adopted an extreme form of objectivism in the law, while, at the
same time, they were developing the classical model of contract with its emphasis on free
choice and consent"); Macneil, supra note 332, at 883-84 (noting how far the objective mani-
festations of assent the courts actually enforce may stray from the parties' subjective
intentions).
351. "Just as the process of interpreting a statute is really a process of subsidiary legisla-
tion, so is the interpretation of a contract really a method of supplementing the original agree-
ment by such provisions as are necessary to determine the point at issue." Cohen, The Basis of
Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 584 (1933), quoted in Hillman, supra note 70, at 618 n.10.
352. For a classic account, see generally Kessler, supra note 13, especially id. at 632, 640.
353. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 225, at 241.
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parties35 4 who did not understand, or even read, the contract 355 and who
may not have been able to bargain for better terms.35 6 Can such parties
meaningfully be said to have consented to the terms of the agreements they
signed, 357 or did new modes of contracting call for new notions of con-
sent?358 Courts grappling with these questions first resorted to interpretative
strategies designed to produce just results. 35 9 More recently, courts have
bound parties to contracts even though their wills had not clearly con-
verged 360 and have expanded the number and scope of the doctrines al-
lowing parties to escape contractual obligations.361
These very familiar generalizations suggest at least two objections to the
argument that promissory estoppel should not be used to enforce illusory
354. Professor Slawson has argued that "[b]usinesses can draft their standard forms to
create practically any legal implications they like." Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract
The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 21, 25 (1984).
Thus, "they not only can create implications that the consumer does not expect, but they can
destroy or reverse the expectations that the consumer has already formed." Id. at 26. In a
similar vein, Atiyah has said that "the 'small print,' which is so commonly seen in written
consumer transactions, is nowadays usually regarded as something which must give way
before the consumer's actual expectations which are nearly always in contradiction to the
small print." PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW, supra note 9, at 6-7.
355. See, e.g, Phillips, supra note 225, at 241.
356. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 13, at 632; Phillips, supra note 225, at 241.
357. Kessler argued that the weaker party's contractual intention "is but a subjection more
or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often
understood only in a vague way, if at all." Kessler, supra note 13, at 632. Karl Llewellyn had
this to say on the subject:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boilerplate clauses, we can recognize that
so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been
assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the
transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent
(not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the
dickered terms.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960), quoted in
Slawson, supra note 354, at 33.
358. Kessler argued that "freedom of contract must mean different things for different
types of contracts." Kessler, supra note 13, at 642. Thus, he argued that "[i]n dealing with
standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting party could le-
gitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's 'calling,' and to what extent
the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation."
Id. at 637. Slawson has argued for a new meaning of contract that would embrace "the par-
ties' reasonable expectations from whatever sources they may derive." Slawson, supra note
354, at 23. Under this new meaning the contract "may consist of more than just the parties'
mutual manifestations of assent, and the manifestations of mutual assent may not be included
in the contract at all." Id. Similarly, Llewellyn argued that:
[Firee contract presupposes free bargain, and that free bargain presupposes free
bargaining: and.. where bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses
to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread
paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that
paper.
Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 704.
359. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., U.C.C. sections 2-204, 2-207 (1978) (modifying traditional definiteness and
"mirror image" rules).
361. The rise of the doctrine of unconscionability is perhaps the best example. See supra




promises because to do so is to deny freedom of contract. First, the general
thrust of twentieth century contract law is to the contrary. Indeed, as the
preceding section's discussion sets out, numerous illusory promise cases are
to the contrary. Second, the movement in modem contract law away from
laissez-faire principles is a justified response to the generally accurate percep-
tion that in today's world nineteenth century freedom of contract often lacks
meaning for the weaker or less sophisticated contracting party. Where such
principles do have meaning, where parties of relatively equal power and so-
phistication completely and knowingly negotiate the terms of their relation-
ship, the policies and principles of classical contract law should assume
greater importance. As we have noted, 362 in these situations it may be en-
tirely proper for courts to reject the application of promissory estoppel. The
broad injustice requirement of section 90 gives the courts ample latitude to
do so. 363 We have also seen that the availability of reliance-based damages
in promissory estoppel cases gives courts the flexibility to achieve a tolerable
accommodation between protection of the promisee's reliance and the prom-
isor's desire to escape an unwanted relationship. 364
2. Promissory Estoppel as an Expression of the Parties' Assent?
The familiar freedom of contract arguments above do not exhaust promis-
sory estoppel's relations with that concept. No discussion of promissory es-
toppel and freedom of contract would be complete without some mention of
recent efforts to portray promissory estoppel as primarily consensual in na-
ture. In support of this claim, it has been argued that the promisor's silence
in the face of the promisee's reliance can be interpreted as a manifestation of
consent, 365 that many promisors in promissory estoppel cases intended their
promises to be binding at the time they were made, 366 and that promissory
estoppel protects essentially consensual arrangements made in situations
where there were significant barriers to (or persuasive explanations for the
362. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
363. In fleshing out that requirement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section
90 comment b (1981) notes that its satisfaction may depend "on the extent to which such other
policies as the enforcement of bargains.. .are relevant." It also adds that "[t]he force of partic-
ular factors varies in different types of cases ... " Id.
364. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
365. See Barnett, supra note 325, at 318-19, 362. "[I]n most [promissory estoppel] cases
liability can be understood as contractual in the broad sense that the promisor apparently
intended to be legally bound by the promise." Barnett & Becker, supra note 96, at 449.
366. See generally Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the
Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987).
Professor Kostritsky argues that if courts find natural barriers to explicitly reciprocal or for-
malized contracting they are likely to embrace a promissory estoppel claim, but that if such
barriers are not in existence they are likely to be more rigorous in their insistence upon proof of
all of the elements of a promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 931. In deciding whether such
barriers exist, she suggests that courts look at the relative status and knowledge of the parties,
the involvement of the parties in some broader relationship, and the existence of a relation of
trust and confidence between the parties. Id. at 906. From our point of view, these factors




absence of) more formalized traditional contracting. 367 Further support for
such characterizations might be found in the tendency of some courts to
award expectation damages in promissory estoppel cases, 368 and in instances
where the doctrine is applied without clear proof of reliance. 369
To the extent that this characterization of promissory estoppel is accurate,
it might at first blush appear to support this Article's contention that the
doctrine should find application in the illusory and de facto illusory promise
context. If promissory estoppel is basically consensual in nature, how can its
use violate the principle of freedom of contract? In the final analysis, how-
ever, a consent-based view of promissory estoppel is antithetical to this Arti-
cle's position. The authors' argument, that promissory estoppel should be
used to protect reliance on illusory promises, rests in large part on the many
cases protecting such reliance under various other doctrines. But if promis-
sory estoppel is no longer about reliance, how can it be employed for this
purpose? More importantly, if promissory estoppel is mainly consensual,
how can it be used to bind promisors who have clearly manifested an intent
not to be bound to their illusory promise?
Reliance is and remains the core of promissory estoppel: reliance was its
genesis and in reliance it finds its justification. In support of this hopefully
uncontroversial view, 370 we first consider the last two arguments character-
izing promissory estoppel as a creature of assent. The Article has discussed
the judicial tendency to award expectation damages even though the raison
367. Farber & Matheson, supra note 157, at 909. See also supra notes 65-79 and accompa-
nying text.
368. Farber & Matheson, supra note 157, at 910-13. Farber and Matheson argue that reli-
ance is "no longer the key to promissory estoppel." Id. at 904. Instead, they assert that prom-
issory estoppel "is being transformed into a new theory of distinctly contractual obligation."
Id. at 905. They propose a new theory of contract under which "any promise made in further-
ance of economic activity is enforceable." Id. at 904-05. In support of their position they
argue that courts are more likely to enforce promises when the promisor has made the promise
with the expectation of receiving some economic benefit from the promisee. Id. at 922.
We do not find this last contention surprising, since the prospect of promisor benefit raises
the spectre of unjust enrichment, thereby implicating the restitution interest. Of the three con-
tract interests protected by contract damage rules, the restitution interest has long been
thought to have the greatest moral claim to protection. See supra note 15. We would also note
that in at least some of the case types in which promissory estoppel originated one must strain
to find an "economic benefit" to the promisor. See supra note 39 (mentioning, inter alia, gratu-
itous agencies and gratuitous bailments). In sum, while we have no problem with treating the
fact that a promise was made in furtherance of economic activity as an important factor mili-
tating in favor of its enforcement, we cannot accept it as the only such factor, and would find it
strange indeed if promissory estoppel were to be severed from its origins in such a fashion.
369. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 777 (huge increase in promissory estoppel ac-
tions since the first Restatement "indicates a resurgence of reliance-based liability at the ex-
pense of consensual liability"); Boyer, supra note 39, at 898 (saying of the cases from which
promissory estoppel originated that "[t]he thread that runs through all the cases is reliance"
and that "[iun this reliance, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has its justification"); Hender-
son, supra note 29, at 361-62 (suggesting that overriding purpose of promissory estoppel is
protection of reliance, not enforcement of promises); Speidel, supra note 246, at 178 (saying of
section 90 that "[h]ere the promisee may have reasonable expectations, but it is his reliance
that justifies enforcement"). See also the italicized portion of the quotation from Henderson
reproduced in supra note 167.
370. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
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d'etre of promissory estoppel is the protection of reliance, 37' and cases exist
in which courts have been less than rigorous in demanding proof of reli-
ance. 372 Because it involves remedial considerations, the former tendency is
tangential to the concern here: the basis on which liability is imposed. In
addition, a number of plausible explanations remain for expectation awards
in promissory estoppel cases, 373 the most straightforward of which is simply
the language of section 90 itself.374 Other considerations include the way an
expectation award can serve as a proxy for a reliance recovery where reli-
ance is present, but is difficult to prove. 375 Similarly, at least some of the
cases appearing to relax the reliance requirement can be explained by judi-
cial perceptions that reliance, and perhaps promisor benefit from reliance,
were probably present but not amenable to proof with any degree of cer-
tainty.376 In any event, such cases do not upset the contentions of this Arti-
cle. Even if promissory estoppel is gradually acquiring a broader application,
371. See, e.g., the discussion of the Jones case in supra note 132. Note also that the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) deletes the requirement that the promisee's reliance be "definite and
substantial" before it will trigger liability, but note further that this change is linked to the new
Restatement's recognition of reliance-based damages. See supra notes 153-155 and accompa-
nying text.
372. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
373. Promises that satisfy section 90's tests are "binding," and one of those tests is that
"injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS section 90(1) (1981) (emphasis added). Also worth mention here is the traditional
tendency to regard promissory estoppel as a "substitute" for various elements of a contract,
especially consideration. When promissory estoppel operates in this way, the plaintiff's recov-
ery is naturally regarded as contractual, and contract damages are just as naturally deemed
appropriate. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 69-70, 72, 77, 130 and accompanying text. For a case in which an
expectation award served as a proxy for "opportunity cost" reliance losses, see Walters v.
Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981). There, the plaintiffs purchased a vacant
service station site and made improvements to it in reliance on promises of a franchise made by
Marathon's representatives during negotiations. Id. at 1099. Prior to acceptance of the plain-
tiffs' proposal, Marathon placed a moratorium on consideration of all new dealer applications.
Id. The trial court found for the plaintiffs on the theory of promissory estoppel, awarding
damages equal to the lost profits they would have earned on their first year's gasoline allotment
had the franchise been awarded. Id. at 1100. On appeal, Marathon contested the damage
award, arguing that the proper measure of damages "should have been the amount of [the
plaintiffs'] expenditures in reliance on the promise, measured by the difference between their
expenditures and the present value of the property," a standard that would have resulted in no
award because the value of the improved property slightly exceeded the plaintiffs' total expend-
itures. Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, observing that:
[I]n reliance upon appellant's promise to supply gasoline supplies to them, ap-
pellees purchased the station, and invested their funds and their time. It is un-
reasonable to assume that they did not anticipate a return of profits from this
investment of time and funds, but, in reliance upon appellant's promise, they
had foregone the opportunity to make the investment elsewhere.
Id.
375. See, e.g., the discussion of the Jones case in supra note 132. See also the discussion of
Grouse in supra note 130; Hillman, supra note 70, at 640 (underlying factor in contract cessa-
tion cases where courts grant expectation awards despite liability decision apparently
grounded in reliance loss may be dependent party's foregone opportunities which, although
too uncertain to be remedied themselves, are nonetheless compelling).
376. Of course, we too are reconceptualizing cases in our treatment of the many decisions
using manipulation of the agreement, good faith, and unconscionability to protect reliance. See
our explicit discussion of our method at supra text accompanying and following notes 17 1-172.
We will address this point in the last paragraph of this section.
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reliance is still at its core. So long as this is true, the doctrine remains poten-
tially available to protect reliance on illusory promises.
The first three arguments sketched above raise different considerations.
The proponents of these arguments do not allege that reliance is absent in
the bulk of the cases where promissory estoppel is used to impose liability.
Rather, they assert that due to factors such as the promisor's silence when
confronted with reliance or the promisor's initial intent that the promise be
binding, some form of consent is also present in such cases. For this reason,
they suggest, cases of this kind should be viewed as instances where consent
is the true basis for imposing liability. This reconceptualization 377 ignores
the explicit basis on which the promisor has been bound in promissory es-
toppel cases. Surely the drafters of the first and second RESTATEMENTS378
and the innumerable courts and commentators who have regarded reliance
as central to promissory estoppel would be surprised to learn that the doc-
trine is really about consent, not reliance. Such reasoning could even render
Hoffman 379 a consent case. There, Red Owl's inducement of Hoffman's reli-
ance might conceivably be regarded as a manifestation of its assent, and it is
possible that Red Owl initially intended to grant Hoffman a franchise on
some set of terms. Yet reliance, not consent, was the rationale for the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's decision to bind Red Owl.3 80
Admittedly, in some of the cases under discussion the courts may have
377. Although we hope that this exercise is unnecessary, we note again that RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS section 90 (1932) makes a promise "binding" if, among other things, it
"does induce such action or forbearance," the word "such" referring to "action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee." See supra text accompany-
ing note 44. And RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 90(1) (1981) similarly
makes a promise "binding" if, among other things, it "does induce such action or forbear-
ance," the "such" in this case referring to "action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or
a third person." See supra note 152.
378. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). See supra
notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
379. The court decided the case under section 90 of the first RESTATEMENT, see 26 Wis. 2d
at 694-96, 133 N.W.2d at 273-74, and concluded that there was ample evidence to support the
jury's special verdict that Hoffman had relied in the exercise of ordinary care, id. at 696-97,
133 N.W.2d at 274. Indeed, it explicitly stated that Hoffman's promissory estoppel claim was
not a breach of contract action. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275; see supra note 94 and accompa-
nying text. And it awarded Hoffman his reliance losses. See id. at 699-01, 133 N.W.2d at 275-
77; see also supra note 92.
380. Such expectations, however, are contextual and do not arise from either the language
of the agreement or the traditional legal rules governing the relationship. Consider, for exam-
ple, a case in which two law firms interview third-year law students. Both firms are located in
the same city, enjoy equally excellent reputations, offer equally attractive compensation pack-
ages, and are in all other respects on an equal footing. Firm A, however, has each student read
and sign a waiver that says:
I understand that in the event that I am offered and accept a position with Firm
A, the firm reserves the right to terminate my employment at any time, for any
reason, without notice. I also understand that such termination may occur after
acceptance, but before I have actually reported for work.
Firm B does not employ such a waiver, and A and B make offers to the same group of stu-
dents. Although law students (if anyone) may be presumed to know that both firms are offer-
ing employment-at-will and that A's waiver merely states the traditional rule of such
employment, see supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text, we suspect that B will get more
acceptances because A's waiver serves to negate the actual expectations that most students
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been striving, consciously or subconsciously, to enforce the parties' true
agreement by rewarding contextual expectations not reflected by the agree-
ment's language. In particular, we concede that in some illusory promise
cases, the imposition of liability on the promisor rewards the actual expecta-
tions of the promisee.3 8' (Indeed, such expectations have probably moti-
vated reliance in illusory promise cases, and promissory estoppel has served
to protect those expectations. 382) But a consent-based theory of liability pre-
sumably requires that both the promisor and the promisee share some com-
mon set of expectations, and it is difficult to see how the promisor's
expectations match the promisee's in illusory or de facto illusory promise
cases. Here, as suggested above, the language of a contract manifests either
the promisor's intent not to be bound or his desire to be bound under very
limited circumstances. Even if one could argue that such language does not
reflect the promisor's actual intent at the time of agreement, 3 83 it certainly
reflects the legal position he will take in the event of termination. For these
probably harbor about offers of employment. Enforcing B's promise despite its illusory nature
protects those expectations.
Similarly, a franchisor whose franchise agreements contain a provision explicitly warning
prospective franchisees that their franchise may be terminated despite acceptable performance
and without any reimbursement of reliance losses, and who requires franchisees to read and
separately sign the provision, is likely to sign up fewer franchisees than a competitor who does
not follow similar practices. We suspect that most franchisees' expectations concerning termi-
nation probably mirror the expectation of nonarbitrary termination alleged by the franchisee in
Corenswet. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. Again, enforcing the franchisor's prom-
ise where he has not disclosed the promise's nonbinding nature protects the franchisee's
expectations.
381. For example, we believe the promisee's expectations were accurately captured by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the Grouse case, where liability was based on promissory estop-
pel. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text, especially supra text accompanying note
129. For a case where such expectations were frustrated by a denial of recovery, see the dis-
cussion of the Forrer decision in supra note 133. To digress a bit, what about the promisee's
prospects for a promissory estoppel recovery in the first of each pair of hypotheticals set out in
supra note 380-the situations where the promisor made some sort of disclosure? To the extent
that the promisee has been effectively informed of legal rules and contract provisions or prom-
isor interpretations that run counter to his natural expectations, and also had available effec-
tive alternative courses of action, the "injustice" requirement of promissory estoppel
presumably would not be met and any reliance losses in the face of such warnings would
remain unrecoverable. But effective warnings provided by a promisor with sufficiently superior
bargaining power to dictate the terms of the transaction present a more difficult problem. We
are inclined to suggest that the outcome in such situations should depend on the reasonable-
ness of the promisor's justification for terminating the parties' relationship or refusing to go
through with the transaction. The more justifiable the promisor's action, the less inclined we
would be to protect promisee reliance at the expense of private autonomy. As the justification
for the promisor's actions loses force, our willingness to protect reliance would increase. Even
here, however, we would be inclined to afford some deference to notions of private autonomy
by awarding reliance-based damages instead of either an expectation award or the imposition
of an unwanted relationship on the promisor.
382. In many cases, we believe, the contract's language reflects the promisor's intent all too
well. For example, the actual intent of many employers offering an at-will employment could
probably be expressed as: "You'll have a job as long as you perform acceptably, but our need
for your services is subject to economic conditions that could have a negative impact on our
ability to operate profitably at current levels of employment and at this location."
383. For example, promissory estoppel cannot explain the enforcement of the promises
contained in a wholly executory bilateral contract, because no reliance could have occurred in
such situations. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 535, 550.
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reasons, it is difficult to argue that a promisor who has made an illusory or
de facto illusory promise consented to some true agreement or some subtext
whose terms incorporate the promisee's expectations. Yet many courts have
protected the promisee's expectations by basing liability on such promises-
often, as argued at length, because of the promisee's reliance. In other words,
a consent-based theory of promissory liability cannot explain many of the
judicial opinions discussed in this Article.
Thus, the argument that promissory estoppel is consensual fails because it
ignores the express basis on which innumerable promissory estoppel deci-
sions have proceeded, and because the consent-based theory of promissory
liability it presupposes cannot account for the courts' tendency to enforce
illusory promises. But are not this Article's own arguments subject to analo-
gous objections? In contending that promissory estoppel should apply to il-
lusory promises because any number of underground cases have protected
such reliance under other legal rubrics, we de-emphasize the rationales
under which those cases actually proceeded. And if a consent-based theory
of promissory liability fails because it cannot explain every instance where
such liability has been imposed, promissory estoppel likewise fails.3 84 In re-
sponse to the first objection one can at least point to cases where the prom-
isee's reliance was expressly made a factor in the decision to enforce an
illusory promise, even though the court formally proceeded under some doc-
trine other than estoppel. As for the second, the argument is merely that
promissory estoppel should be used to enforce illusory promises where the
doctrine's elements are satisfied; the authors are not propounding some gen-
eral theory of promissory liability.385 While they would not go so far as to
embrace Arthur Leff's statement that "even in the best of circumstances
there probably is no coherent, understandable explanation for anything, '386
they can live with the idea that there need not be a single, unifying explana-
tion for everything. Contract law may well have "too many rooms to unlock
with one key,"'387 and no reason exists why reliance, bargain, and restitution
principles cannot continue their longstanding, if somewhat uneasy, coexis-
tence.3 88 The authors do, however, believe that in the illusory promise cases
384. See, e.g., supra notes 217-18, 282-83 and accompanying text.
385. In fact, though, attempts have been made to unify contract law around the theme of
reliance. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 534-36 (criticizing such efforts).
386. Speidel, supra note 246, at 163 (citing Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1010 (1978)).
387. Eisenberg, supra note 333, at 1109.
388. Professor Feinman has observed that the "[t]heoretical problems concerning the rela-
tion of reliance and bargain have never been satisfactorily resolved, but theoretical incoherence
has not kept lawyers and judges from using the [reliance] doctrine extensively." Feinman,
supra note 1, at 1374-75. Professor Speidel, in commenting on the "shift from rules to stan-
dards in contract law," observed that contract doctrine "seems to have shifted from a system
of structured rules existing 'out there' to be applied with ineluctable logic to particular disputes
to a group of overlapping standards that have precise meaning only when they are particular-
ized in each case." Speidel, supra note 246, at 176. To the extent that such a shift has taken
place, it may reflect the triumph of the realist critique of classical contract doctrine, which
questioned whether important questions arising in actual cases could be answered by "a priori
theorizing or by tacit assumptions," and argued that a better method is to classify cases by
their factual patterns rather than by doctrine. Speidel, supra note 83, at 788-89 (citing Cook,
Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 497, 502, 511 (1939)).
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the prospect of reliance losses often creates a compelling claim for relief, and
that promissory estoppel is the best basis for providing such relief. But where
no such losses are in evidence, and no suggestion of untoward promisor ben-
efit tips the scales in favor of enforcement,38 9 the authors would be content
to defer to what remains of the principle of private autonomy by denying
recovery. 390
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by asking whether the camel of promissory estoppel
should be allowed to intrude into the corner of the contract tent occupied by
illusory promises. Certainly it has so intruded, as some courts have explic-
itly used the doctrine to protect reliance on illusory promises.39' More im-
portantly, many cases currently decided under the rubrics of good faith and
unconscionability are better explained as exemplars of the reliance principle.
In those cases, the prospect of promisee reliance losses-sometimes coupled
with benefit to the promisor from that reliance-provided a major impetus
for the courts' actions. In taking such action, the courts have imposed defi-
nite limits on the promisor's freedom of action, and evidently have been
unimpressed by the notion that it is unreasonable to rely on a hitherto unen-
forceable promise.
Historically, the protection of promissory reliance has sometimes pro-
ceeded under more traditional doctrines before being reconceptualized as an
application of promissory estoppel. 392 Such a reconceptualization would be
salutary in the illusory promise context. The law's development and applica-
tion are better effected when the real bases of decision are fully acknowl-
edged and articulated. Also, reliance-based damage awards seem
particularly appropriate to many of the situations where a promisee's reli-
ance on an illusory promise raises compelling claims for relief.39 3 Such
awards can strike an appropriate balance between adequate protection of the
promisee's reliance interest and respect for the autonomy of a promisor who
has consciously sought to avoid a binding commitment.
Although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS sends inconsis-
tent (but largely negative) signals on the illusory promise issue, 394 it none-
theless provides a basis for promissory estoppel's extension to this area. The
second RESTATEMENT specifically recognizes almost all of the new applica-
tions for the doctrine over the past fifty years. In particular, it unequivocally
authorizes both the protection of reliance on indefinite promises and awards
389. On benefit to the promisor as a factor militating in favor of the promisee's recovery,
see, e.g., supra notes 368, 380.
390. See, e.g., supra notes 346, 362-63 and accompanying text (arguing deference to con-
ventional contract principles where promisor and promisee bargained on a relatively equal
basis).
391. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
392. This is most true of the doctrine's original formulation. See supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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of reliance-based damages.395 The line between indefinite promises and illu-
sory promises is often quite difficult to draw; and, like illusory promises,
indefinite promises have traditionally been regarded as improper subjects for
the ministrations of the reliance principle. 396 Also, reliance-based damage
awards remove one traditional objection to protecting reliance on both indef-
inite and illusory promises: the contention that in neither case was there a
promise capable of enforcement.3 97 For all these reasons, it is somewhat
anomalous that the authors of the second RESTATEMENT stopped short of
endorsing promissory estoppel's application to illusory promises. Should a
third RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ever appear, expect this deficiency to
be remedied.
395. See supra notes 155, 159-60 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 82-87, 111-14 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 82-85, 111-12 and accompanying text.
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